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1 Executive summary 
Based on the study ‘Background to jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland’ (Eser Davolio et al. 2015 with 
a sample of 66 jihadist-motivated travellers), the research status and current level of data available are 
analysed using an increased sample of jihadist-motivated persons. In comparison to studies from 
neighbouring countries, a largely similar picture emerges in terms of relevant push and pull factors. 
Male, Muslim, second-generation persons aged between 21 and 35 years of age with a relatively low 
level of education and links to peers with similar orientation are overrepresented in the sample. Particular 
importance is also attached to the phenomenon of conversion. In view of the fact that around 40% of 
the persons surveyed (N=130) receive state welfare benefits,  relevant follow-up questions are raised 
here with regard to resocialisation and reintegration. 
In relation to the challenges in the prison system, the interviews with prison directors show that 
considerations are made and strategies applied regarding placement, execution of sentence, separation 
and institutional and individual monitoring when dealing with radicalised jihadist inmates. As long periods 
of pretrial detention are common in such cases, there is generally little scope for measures, such as 
therapy and reintegration. Concepts for dealing with radicalised inmates and promoting resocialisation 
and disengagement must be developed, approaches regarding cantonal ‘core extremism groups’ or the 
involvement of Muslim spiritual advisers must be further elaborated and monitoring of potential risks – 
particularly concerning the protection of potentially endangered fellow inmates – must be driven forward.  
As far as prevention is concerned, the extremism specialist units have increased from two in 2015 to 
nine now and the bridge-building specialist units from three to eight (as at May 2019). In particular, cities 
and cantons which experienced high levels of jihadist radicalisation have recruited specialists and 
developed expertise on prevention. As low-threshold points of contact, they can usually clear up the 
uncertainties that radicalisation phenomena or associated situations can trigger and contribute towards  
resolving issues by advising the persons involved as second-level prevention. In contrast, the bridge-
building specialist units primarily focus on building trust and dialogue with mosque associations as well 
as providing information in the field of asylum as part of radicalisation prevention. This means they play 
a key link role between the Muslim organisations and the police and other administrative bodies. 
In summary, individual cantons and cities expanded prevention units between May 2015 and May 2019, 
but they are still far from available nationwide in the overall context of Switzerland. While progress has 
been made and experience accumulated in prevention and intervention, there are still gaps in the fields 





2 Research design 
2.1 Research question of the exploratory study 
The strengthening of the jihadist groups operating in the context of regional trouble spots in the Middle 
East has triggered a wave of radicalisation unprecedented in its scope since 2013. Europe has not 
escaped this either. This is indicated, amongst other things, by the number of people who have travelled 
from European states to conflict regions since 2013 to join jihadist groups or who have taken part in 
terrorist activities – in the name of a group – in their native or host countries. 
The ‘Islamic State’ group (IS) – which is probably the main driver of this trend – has come under severe 
pressure militarily since mid-2016 and has had to relinquish its model based on territorial control over 
the last few years. In light of these developments, the number of jihadist-motivated travellers has fallen 
sharply since mid-2016.  The trend, which has been observed globally, is also evident in the context of 
Switzerland.  However, the danger presented by people who have been radicalised without necessarily 
seeking to leave the country continues to exist in European states, including Switzerland.  Questions 
are also increasingly being raised at the moment about how terrorism-relevant cases are dealt with by 
the judicial/legal system and what approach should be adopted towards these persons before, during 
and after imprisonment. Preventative measures to stop violent extremism, the question of incarceration 
and reintegration may therefore continue to present significant challenges for the relevant actors in 
future – including in Switzerland. 
This is why the exploratory study focused primarily on questions related to new findings about 
radicalisation processes in Switzerland, in order to set out recommendations on prevention, intervention 
as well as reintegration from the knowledge acquired. The emphasis was placed on the following 
research questions: 
a) What are the individual, psychological, socio-demographic and group-specific backgrounds of 
the young people and adults who are categorised as radicalised jihadists? 
b) What preventative and risk-increasing factors and contextual conditions have to be taken into 
account in the prison system in relation to jihadist radicalisation?  
c) Which prevention and intervention strategies have proven effective for the extremism and 
bridge-building specialist units? 
2.2 Approach and acknowledgements  
Various approaches, which are explained in greater detail in the following chapters, were selected to 
answer the research questions raised as part of this exploratory study:  
1. A quantitative analysis of anonymized data of selected cases of radicalisation. The Federal 
Intelligence Service (FIS) provided the anonymized data.    
2. Structured interviews in the prison system1 and expert interviews  
3. Structured interviews on the determination of means of prevention and intervention  
We wish to thank the FIS for the completion of the grid on the background to jihadist radicalisation for 
130 people and the interviews used to address the first research question. The mediation and expertise 
of the Federal Office of Police (fedpol) was also very helpful in carrying out the study. With regard to the 
 
1 See Schneuwly Purdie (2014). ‘Formatting Islam versus Mobilizing Islam in Prison. Evidence from the Swiss case.’ and Schneu-
wly Purdie (2011) ‘Silence… Nous sommes en direct avec Allah. L’émergence d’intervenants musulmans en contexte 
carcérial’. Also see articles like ‘La prison face au djihad’ (prison faced with jihad) in Esprit 2016/11 or the observations of 
Farhad Khosrokhavar (2013) in ‘Radikalisierung’ on prisons as a melting pot of hate for society in a reinterpretation of the 
frustration experienced. The extent to which such conclusions can be applied to the Swiss context or to which other 




approach to the second part, we wish to express our thanks to the Office of the Attorney General of 
Switzerland (OAG) and all prison system managers interviewed for the insights into how issues of 
extremism are dealt with. For the third part, we are grateful to all the bridge-building and extremism 
specialist units for their willingness to cooperate. Not least, we wish to thank the focus group for their 
input and critical feedback and greatly appreciate the active support of the Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs (FDFA), represented by the Division for Security Policy, which commissioned the study. 
2.3 Classification of terms and definitions 
Various interpretations and definitions exist for the term ‘radicalisation’. What ‘radicalisation’ refers to 
and how the term is used can therefore vary.2 Some universal elements can nevertheless be identified 
in the commonly used definitions. Radicalisation is often defined as a process that leads to an extremist3 
belief system being accepted which legitimises, supports or facilitates the use of violence with the 
objective of achieving social change.4 
Salafism is an ultra-conservative movement within Islam. Followers of this movement interpret the Koran 
literally and attempt to emulate the everyday lives of the first Muslims in their own lives.5 The current 
Salafist movement is nevertheless extremely heterogeneous.6 While acknowledging the 
oversimplification of such categorisation, the Salafists can be divided into three categories. Quietist 
Salafists attach great importance to strict adherence to religious laws by the individual, but are apolitical. 
Political Salafists aim to reshape the society or state where they live according to their vision through 




2 Beelmann, A. (2019). Grundlagen eines entwicklungsorientierten Modells der Radikalisierung. Expert opinion for the 24th Ger-
man Prevention Day on 20 and 21 May 2019 in Berlin. http://www.praeventionstag.de/dokumentation/down-
load.cms?id=2792&datei=DPT24_Stellungnahme_Beelmann_web-2792.pdf ; Sedgwick, M. (2010). The concept of radi-
calization as a source of confusion. Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, 479-494. 
3  ‘Extremist’ refers to a relative position on a continuum of organised opinions. See: Sedgwick, M. (2010). The concept of radi-
calization as a source of confusion. Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, 479-494. ‘Extremist’ generally refers to movements 
and parties, ideas and attitudes as well as patterns of behaviour which reject the democratic constitutional state, the 
separation of powers, the multi-party system and the right to opposition. In place of political opposition, extremists differ-
entiate between friend and enemy. As a result, they strictly reject other opinions and interests and believe in specific, 
supposedly irrefutable political and social objectives or laws. See: The Swiss Confederation’s Report on Extremism of 
14.3.2004, p. 5019. 
 https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2004/5011.pdf  
4 Vidino, L. (2013). Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland. Center for Security Studies (CSS) study. p. 6.  
5 The first Muslims of the congregation of the Prophet Mohammed and the subsequent two generations are called ‘al-salaf al-
salih’ (the righteous predecessors) in Arabic. See: Bolliger, M. Steinvorth, D. (2018). Islamisten, Salafisten, Jihadisten: 
Eine Begriffserklärung. Neue Zürcher Zeitung. https://www.nzz.ch/international/islamisten-salafisten-jihadisten-
ld.1392932     
6 Vidino, L. (2013). Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland. CSS study. p. 6; Wiktorowicz, Q. (2006). Anatomy of the Salafi Move-
ment. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 29:3. p. 207.   
7 Amghar, S. (2011). Le Salafisme d’Aujourd’hui: Mouvements Sectaires en Occident. Paris: Michalon. Wiktorowicz, Q. (2006). 




3 Backgrounds to jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland 
Authors: Fabien Merz and Johannes Saal 
3.1 Trends from neighbouring countries 
Attempts to shed light on and compare the backgrounds to jihadist radicalisation are challenging8. 
Empirical national studies are usually based on different categories of person due to the lack of data – 
for example, persons who travelled to a conflict zone where they joined a jihadist group (jihadist-
motivated travellers9) or persons who have committed offences related to terrorist activities and have 
been sentenced accordingly are included in the sample. However, as individual categories of person 
only ever represent some of the radicalised persons with a tendency for extreme violence, these studies 
can also reflect a sub-segment of the phenomenon of jihadist radicalisation. Different survey methods, 
time periods and divergent definitions of the applicable categories of persons and key concepts also 
make it difficult to compare the results.  
Despite these reservations, the following brief overview aims to identify recurring trends in the 
backgrounds to jihadist radicalisation from the results of the studies of neighbouring countries discussed 
here.10 The overview provided here should help the reader to better classify the results explained in the 
next chapter on the background to jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland.   
In Germany, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (BfV) and the Hesse Information and Competence Centre against Extremism (HKE) 
analysed radicalisation backgrounds and histories in a study published at the end of 2016.11 Information 
on the socio-demographic background and radicalisation factors of a total of 784 persons was collected 
and evaluated where the German interior security authorities knew that they had or had actively 
attempted to travel from Germany to Syria and Iraq up to the end of June 2016.  
The analysis of this data shows that 79% of the persons who travelled were male and 21% female. The 
average age (at the time of initial departure) was 25.8 years of age. The biggest age group numerically 
is 22–25, followed by the 18–21 age group. However, the age at the time of departure ranges from 13 
to 62 years of age. The study authors also have information about the highest school-leaving 
 
8 For reasons of space and in view of the substantial preliminary work already carried out in this area, systematically exploring the 
various theories of radicalisation, in other words what causes radicalisation, has been intentionally avoided. The following 
overview, for example, is recommended in this regard: Jost, Jannis (2017). Der Forschungsstand zum Thema Radikali-
sierung. SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Studien, vol. 1, issue 1, p. 80–89. Where relevant, the applicable theories 
are selectively covered in the following sub-chapter (3.2.). 
9 In the study, the term ‘jihadist-motivated traveller’ is used explicitly and not the term ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ (FTF) which is 
common in English-language literature. Whereas the latter is defined in Resolution 2178 of the UN Security Council as 
individuals who “travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, 
planning, preparation of, or participating in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training”, the term does 
not differentiate between the various ideological motivations that may lie behind such travel. In contrast, the term ‘jihadist-
motivated traveller’ refers to the ideological motivation without overlooking the variance in actions related to the jihadist-
motivated travel as set out in Resolution 2178. Neither the term ‘jihadist-motivated traveller’ nor ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ 
are used in Swiss criminal law. Instead, prosecution of jihadist-motivated travel has been carried out under the Federal 
Act on the Proscription of Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and Associated Organisations since 12 December 2014: “Any person 
who on Swiss territory participates in a group or organisation proscribed under Article 1, supports such a group in human 
resources or material terms, organises propaganda campaigns for them or for their aims, recruits for them or promotes 
their activities in any other way shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding five years or to a monetary penalty. 
Any person who commits any of the foregoing acts abroad also commits an offence if he or she is arrested in Switzerland 
and not extradited.” (Article 2). Please also refer to: United Nations Security Council (2014). Resolution 2178. 24 Septem-
ber. https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/foreign-terrorist-fighters/; Swiss Federal Council (2014). Federal Act on the 
Prohibition of Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and Associated Organisations. 12 December. https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classi-
fied-compilation/20142993/index.html  
10 For reasons of space it was decided to restrict the scope to a few key studies from neighbouring countries (France, Germany 
and Italy). The studies were selected based on the criterion of their meaningfulness in relation to the phenomenon of 
radicalisation in the context concerned, which means that – based on the sample sizes used – it can be assumed that the 
studies can at least make a valid statement about part of the phenomenon of radicalisation in the applicable context.  




qualifications of 289 of the 784 persons in total. 36% obtained grammar school university-entrance 
qualifications or subject-specific university-entrance qualifications, 27% secondary or elementary school 
diplomas and 23% middle school diplomas or preliminary secondary school-leaving qualifications. 166 
persons were unemployed before travelling and the study authors assume that 111 persons were in 
employment before/up to their departure. In terms of geographical distribution, an urban concentration 
(89% lived in urban environments) and key regional locations (over half of the travellers come from just 
13 cities) can be observed.  
Four out of five travellers (81%) have a migrant background.12 The majority of the persons who travelled 
were nevertheless primarily socialised in Germany (61% were born in Germany and of the persons born 
abroad, just under 40% came to Germany during their childhood or early youth, i.e. under the age of 
14). Information about converts is available for 134 persons (around 17%).13 Of the 778 people for whom 
information exists, two-thirds were known to the police (26% for violent offences, 24% for offences 
against property and 18% for drugs-related offences) and were predominantly multiple offenders.  
While internet propaganda is a factor, contact with like-minded people in the real world – particularly in 
mosques, with friends, at Islamic seminars and at Koran distribution initiatives – seems to play a much 
more important role in radicalisation. The time period from the beginning of radicalisation to the point of 
departure is over a year for the vast majority of persons. A fifth (22%) were radicalised within six months 
prior to their departure.  
Using legal sources, Hecker from the ‘Institut français des relations internationales’ (Ifri) created a 
database on 137 individuals who were convicted of terrorism-related offences in France between 2004 
and 2017. The study published in mid-2018 showed that the persons included in the sample were 26 
years of age on average at the time of the events that resulted in their conviction.14 They generally have 
a low level of education15 and were less well integrated in the labour market than the average population 
before their conviction (36% unemployed, 22% in precarious employment relationships). There are also 
key regional locations in terms of geographic distribution. 
Most of the persons convicted were born in France and grew up there. According to the study’s author, 
they are what are known as ‘home-grown terrorists’ in most cases. Many of the persons convicted have 
a migration background from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa.16 74% of the persons in the sample 
 
12 According to the official definition, persons who travelled with migration backgrounds include “all persons who emigrated to the 
current territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949 and all foreign nationals born in Germany and all persons 
born in Germany as German citizens with at least one parent who emigrated to or was born in Germany as a foreign 
national.” See: German Federal Criminal Police Office, German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and 
the Hesse Information and Competence Centre against Extremism (2016). Analysis of the radicalisation backgrounds and 
histories of persons who travelled from Germany to Syria and Iraq for Islamist reasons. 7 December. 
https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/Publikationsreihen/Forschungsergebnisse/2016Analyse-
RadikalisierungsgruendeSyrienIrakAusreisende.html    
13 By comparison: It is estimated that of the 4.95 million Muslims living in Germany in 2017, between 20,000 and 100,000 have 
converted to Islam. It can therefore be assumed that converts account for 1% to 5% of the Muslims living in Germany. 
See: Ozyurek, Esra (2014). Being German, becoming Muslim: race, religion, and conversion in the new Europe. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, USA.   
14 However, the fact that around 70 young people who are being prosecuted for terrorism-related offences at the time of the survey 
are not included in the sample must be taken into account. The proportion of women in the sample was around 4%. As 
women have long been less systematically prosecuted for terrorism-related offences than men in France, the study author 
assumes that women make up a much higher proportion of radicalised jihadists in France than the sample reflects. Based 
on a study by F. Benslama and F. Khosrokhavar, it is assumed that women account for around 30% of the jihadist-
motivated travellers with a connection to France. See: Benslama & Khosrokhavar (2017). Le jihadisme des Femmes. 
Paris: Seuil. p. 13.    
15 Of 68 out of 137 persons for whom information about level of education exists, 47% had not attended secondary school and 
only 24% had obtained university-entrance qualifications, for example. According to the study’s author, these figures are 
very low. 
16 Of the persons for whom information on ethnic background exists, a majority (74) have parents who come from the Maghreb, 




were born into Muslim families and 26% were converts.17 A relatively high rate of criminality is also 
evident: Of the 126 persons for whom information on this exists, 50 had at least one previous conviction 
(often for violence-related, theft, fraud, drug-dealing and motoring offences). 22 of them had served a 
prison sentence prior to their conviction for terrorism.  
In an in-depth analysis of the profiles, Hecker (2018) also observes that radicalisation tends to be a long 
process (lasting between several months and several years). While the internet seems to act as a 
catalyst for radicalisation, the consumption of propaganda material online alone is not sufficient. The 
study author highlights the importance of group dynamics and contacts in the real world to a much 
greater extent here.  
Marone and Vidino (2018)18 analysed data on 125 jihadist-motivated travellers in total for Italy. Their 
analysis reveals the following picture: 90.4% are male. The average age at the time of departure was 
30. The majority of jihadist-motivated travellers were born abroad, in particular in Tunisia (40), Morocco 
(26), Syria (14) and Iraq (6). Only 8.8% were born in Italy and a further 19.2% are Italian citizens. In 
contrast to Germany and France, two-thirds (66.4%) are first-generation immigrants. 66.6% of the 
persons included, for whom the study’s authors have information on their place of residence, lived in 
northern Italy before their departure, the main region being Lombardy (39.4%). The level of education 
is predominantly classified as low, with just 12.3% holding average to high educational qualifications. 
34.4% were unemployed before departure and another 44.8% performed unskilled jobs. Converts 
account for 11.2% of the sample and almost half of them are women.19 44% had committed previous 
offences and 22.4% had served a custodial sentence – drug use is on record for 19.2%. Less than half 
(46.4%) were identified due to their online activities and a further 42.2% had links with other jihadist-
motivated travellers. The study’s authors underline that the relationship with peers often appears to have 
played a significant role. 
Whereas the German and Italian studies concern jihadist-motivated travellers, the French study focuses 
on persons convicted of terrorism-related offences. Here it should be highlighted once again that the 
studies selected only reflect part of the overall phenomenon in the respective context due to the fact 
that the different categories of persons observed, survey methods and time periods as well as the partly 
divergent definitions of the key concepts cannot be compared with one another directly. Certain trends 
can nevertheless be identified. 
The following observations can be made about the socio-demographic background of the persons in 
Germany, France and Italy affected by jihadist radicalisation:  
- Men are clearly overrepresented. 
- The 18 to 30 age group seems to be the most significantly affected, but a wide age range can 
be observed.  
- Persons with a low level of education are overrepresented.  
- Those observed seem to be poorly integrated into the employment market.  
- Persons with a migration background are overrepresented. They are nevertheless mainly 
born, or at least socialised, in the western country concerned (second generation) – with the 
exception of Italy where the first generation is predominant. 
- Geographical hotspots exist.  
- There is a rather high rate of criminality prior to jihadist radicalisation. 
 
17 By comparison: It is estimated that of the 5.7 million Muslims living in France, around 100,000 have converted to Islam. It can 
therefore be assumed that converts account for around 1.8% of the Muslims living in France. See: Galonnier, Juliette 
(2017). L’islam des convertis. La Vie des Idées. https://laviedesidees.fr/L-islam-des-convertis.html#nb1   
18 Marone Francesco, Vidino Lorenzo (2019). Destination Jihad: Italy’s Foreign Fighters. International Centre for Counter Terror-
ism. https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Marone-Vidino-Italys-Foreign-Fighters-March2019.pdf  
19 By comparison: It is estimated that of the 1.2 million Muslims living in Italy, between 20,000 and 35,000 have converted to Islam. 
It can therefore be assumed that converts account for 1.6% to 2.9% of the Muslims living in Italy. See: United States 





- Converts are clearly overrepresented.   
The following observations can be made about the social context and the radicalisation factors.  
- Consumption of relevant content on the internet appears to play a supporting role, but is rarely 
a sufficient factor alone for radicalisation. 
- Group dynamics and contacts in the real world with like-minded persons seem to play a 
decisive role in the radicalisation process. 
- Radicalisation tends to be a long process. ‘Blitz radicalisation’ within a few months appears to 
be the exception.   
3.2 Grid and analysis of jihadist-radicalised persons in Switzerland 
3.2.1 Data and categories of person 
The quantitative data on which the following analysis of Islamic extremism in Switzerland is based was 
provided by the FIS.20 The FIS was provided with a grid for this purpose. The variables defined in it can 
be divided into four larger groups: 
1) socio-demographic information, such as age, gender, relationship status, origin, place of residence, 
level of education and occupation;  
2) social context and personality, such as family problems, use of drugs, psychological abnormalities, 
criminality and experience of violence;  
3) radicalisation factors, such as peer groups, the internet, missionary activities and contact with Salafist 
preachers; 
4) jihadist activities with particular emphasis on jihadist-motivated travel. 
The sample includes 130 people in total. It is a selection by the FIS of cases which have been dealt with 
as a priority by the FIS over the past ten years. The selected persons meet the following criteria: Their 
place of residence is or was in Switzerland and they can be assigned to the jihadist spectrum as they 
have exercised violence or at least legitimised it ideologically in the context of their ideological and 
religious beliefs. The persons selected by the FIS are or were mainly ‘high-risk persons’. The only 
exception are a few older cases when the term was not yet used. The FIS uses the term ‘high-risk 
persons’ to designate persons who “present an increased risk to Switzerland’s internal and external 
security.”21 They are determined “using a combination of very precise criteria where a specific 
connection to violence is the decisive factor.”22 However, it does not just include violent extremists, but 
also supporters and propagandists of jihadist groups. These high-risk persons also include persons who 
have come to the attention of the FIS due to jihadist-motivated travel as well as persons who have been 
identified due to indications of radicalisation, whether through internet activities or specific patterns of 
behaviour.   
More than half of the sample (55.4%) consists of cases of jihadist-motivated travellers. In addition to the 
72 jihadist-motivated travellers,23 nine other persons are listed (6.9%) whose departure was prevented. 
There is no direct relationship with jihadist-motivated travel in the other 49 radicalisation cases selected 
(36.7%).  
 
20 The data was provided to the research group on the base of a data delivery contract as part of the implementation of the National 
Action Plan (NAP) to Prevent and Combat Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (2017), area of action 1, measure 1.  




23 Whereas the number of jihadist-motivated travellers communicated to the public by the FIS contains individuals who generally 
have a connection to Switzerland, in the form of family relationships for example, only persons who actually resided in 




The data grid completed by the FIS is a list cumulatively compiled over a period of time and not a list of 
all persons currently under observation. In particular, socio-demographic variables and information on 
jihadist-motivated travel are complete in almost all cases. In contrast, we only have information for half 
or sometimes even fewer persons in the sample for some variables on social context and radicalisation 
factors. On the one hand, the evaluation of these variables only has limited meaningfulness due to the 
incomplete data set. They are neither representative of Swiss jihadists in general nor of the sample itself 
and consequently only have limited meaningfulness for possible conclusions. We will present these 
results with information on the low number of cases so that the fragile data basis in the individual areas 
is transparent to readers. On the other, we hope to obtain a broader and more precise insight into the 
phenomenon due to the various categories of actors in contrast to previous studies which concern a 
particular group in the jihadist milieu (e.g. jihadist-motivated travellers, convicted terrorists). 
Descriptive statistical methods, such as frequency distribution and averaging calculations, are used in 
the following analysis. More complex, multivariate analytical methods are not used in view of the 
significant variations in the depth of information. A more in-depth qualitative analysis is also refrained 
from as this would  require qualitative data on the individual cases in the form of expert psychiatric 
opinions, records of hearings and court records. This means the data analysis method selected here is 
largely determined by the data available to us. 
To ensure additional anonymisation of the cases, the following results of the descriptive, statistical data 
analysis are only presented as aggregate data and no individual biographical details are used. This 
excludes the possibility of individual persons being traced from the outset. 
3.2.2 Socio-demographics 
The phenomenon of jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland seems to concern a disproportionately high 
number of young men as only 14 women (11%) of 130 persons recorded in total are listed in the sample. 
The small proportion of radicalised women in Switzerland is rather low compared to the proportion of 
women in most other European countries which stands at around 10% to 30%.24 The average age of 
the persons in the sample is 28 years and corresponds to the results of comparable studies in other 
European countries such as Germany25 and France26. A breakdown into the various age groups27 shows 
that two-thirds were aged between 21 and 35 at the time of their radicalisation. However, a quarter of 
the individuals can be assigned to the older cohorts aged over 30 and 10% even to the over 40-year-
old group (see fig. 1).  
Repeated warnings have been made in recent years about the increasing radicalisation of minors in 
particular. However, the radicalisation of young people (aged 14 to 18), such as the siblings from 
Winterthur whose departure to join the ‘Islamic State’ at the end of 2014 attracted media attention,28 
seems to be an exception in Switzerland. In fact, in 18% of cases the persons were still young adults 
under the age of 20 when they were radicalised, but only a third of them were minors (6% of the sample). 
 
24 German Federal Criminal Police Office, German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Hesse Information 
and Competence Centre against Extremism (2016). Analysis of the radicalisation backgrounds and histories of persons 
who travelled from Germany to Syria and Iraq for Islamist reasons. 7 December. https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Down-
loads/DE/Publikationen/Publikationsreihen/Forschungsergebnisse/2016AnalyseRadikalisierungsgruendeSyrienI-
rakAusreisende.html; Benslama, Fethi and Farhad Khosrokhavar (2017). Le jihadisme des Femmes. Paris: Seuil; Marone 
Francesco, Vidino Lorenzo (2019). Destination Jihad: Italy’s Foreign Fighters. International Centre for Counter Terrorism. 
https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Marone-Vidino-Italys-Foreign-Fighters-March2019.pdf 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hecker, Marc (2018). 137 Shades of Terrorism: French Jihadists Before the Court. Institut Français des Relations Internatio-
nales. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/hecker_137_shades_of_terrorism_2018.pdf 
27 The age of the persons was recorded at the time when they first came to the attention of the FIS. 





The breakdown of ages suggests that the radicalisation of young people in Switzerland tends to be a 
marginal problem. 
 
Fig. 1: The age distribution of jihadist-radicalised persons in Switzerland (in absolute figures). 
 
The political commitment of young (male) adults is explained in the research on social movements by 
their ‘biographic availability’, i.e. lack of family and professional commitments.29 This explanatory 
approach was also used in the research on radicalisation.30 In the context of jihadist radicalisation in 
Switzerland, this hypothesis only seems to apply to our results on family status, education and 
occupation to a certain extent. With regard to relationship status, half of the cases contained in our 
sample are single (40%) or separated (13%). The other persons are either married by civil ceremony 
(22%) or at least by religious ceremony (22%)31. The distinction between civil and religious marriage is 
only relevant to a certain extent in our study as the differentiation from an existence as a single person 
is of primary importance. Half of the persons married entered into a life partnership with persons from 
the Salafist/jihadist milieu. Half of the persons recorded are parents of one or more children (17% even 
had three or more children). This finding could in turn have implications for group-specific radicalisation 
processes within family relationship structures (also see 3.2.4.). 
Six of 96 persons (6%) about whom we possess information on the highest educational qualification 
only completed primary level (elementary school). Over 88% of the 96 cases have secondary level 
education whereby most of the cases are professional training in the form of an apprenticeship. The 
apprenticeship was abandoned in eight cases. Only 6% of the persons recorded hold a baccalaureate 
qualification and only 5% were educated at tertiary level.32 Almost a third of the persons surveyed were 
unemployed before their radicalisation (including seven persons who received disability benefits), while 
58% held a job and another 11% were still attending school or studying. This indicates that persons 
 
29 McAdam, Doug (1986). Recruitment to High-Risk Activism: The Case of Freedom Summer. American Journal of Sociology 
92/1: 64-90. 
30 e.g. Lyall, Gavin (2017). Who are the British Jihadists? Identifying Salient Biographical Factors in the Radicalisation Process. 
Perspectives on Terrorism 11/3. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/609/html; Vergani, Matteo 
et al (2018). The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific 
Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1505686?journalCode=uter20.  
31 Religious marriage in the Salafist milieu has a higher status than civil marriage. 
32 By comparison: Just under 40% of young adults had obtained a baccalaureate qualification in 2016, for example. Federal 





undergoing radicalisation are much more frequently affected by unemployment than the Swiss average 
(unemployment stood at 5.1% in 2017). However, this is also due to the fact that during their 
radicalisation some individuals mainly spent their time on new religious practices, activism (such as the 
Koran distribution initiative ‘Lies’) and their social peer group which means they neglect or completely 
give up other activities, such as training or careers. The FIS data available also shows that the proportion 
of unemployed almost doubled from around 33% before radicalisation to around 58% during 
radicalisation which may also be linked to the increased difficulty in finding potential reintegration 
opportunities after criminal proceedings. Around 41% of the cases analysed indicate financial 
dependence on state support in one form or another (e.g. social welfare office, invalidity insurance, 
unemployment benefit, refugee assistance). 
The results of the data analysis also indicate that jihadist-radicalised persons in Switzerland primarily 
live in urban centres and their agglomerations. Only 11.5% of the persons included live or lived in a rural 
area. Jihadist activities are also primarily concentrated in French-speaking and German-speaking 
Switzerland. While just over half of the sample live in German-speaking Switzerland (70 persons), 42.3% 
live in French-speaking Switzerland and just 3.8% in Ticino (see fig. 2). Measured against the total 
population of the respective linguistic regions, individuals classified as being on the jihadist spectrum 
from French-speaking Switzerland (24% of the total Swiss population) seem to be overrepresented and 
those from German-speaking Switzerland (71%) under-represented. With regard to the major Swiss 
regions,33 the variance of geographical distribution of the cases can largely be explained by the 
respective regional populations, but not by the proportion of Muslims (see table 1). The Central Plain 
(Bern, Fribourg, Neuchâtel, Solothurn and Jura) and Zurich regions, where 26 and 21 of the cases lived 
respectively, are amongst Switzerland’s most heavily populated regions, while only few cases live in 
Central Switzerland and Ticino, which have low populations. The Lake Geneva region is an exception 
(cantons of Geneva, Vaud and Valais). 31.5% of all persons in the database come from here which 
means its ratio is almost twice as high as in other major Swiss regions. The Lake Geneva region also 
stands out in relation to the Muslim population in the respective regions and has a much higher 
proportion than the Swiss average. Various studies have drawn attention to the importance of radical 
hotspots at local level34. 
 
33 The places of residence could not be broken down by canton or city due to the anonymisation of the data. 







Fig. 2: Regional distribution of jihadist-radicalised persons in Switzerland  
 
The data also enables statements to be made about the migration background of the persons analysed. 
According to the FIS’s official statement in November 2018, only around a third of the jihadist-motivated 
travellers with close connections to Switzerland actually held a Swiss passport.35 We also determined 
from the data available to us that just 21.5% of the persons originally come from Western and Southern 
Europe36 (including Switzerland). At first glance, such figures may fuel the public debates over migration, 
asylum and religion, which are often indiscriminately grouped together with issues such as internal 
security and the fight against terrorism. However, analysis of other variables in our sample reveals a 
more complex picture. 35.2% of the persons in the sample were born in Switzerland, a further 21.1% 
arrived in Switzerland before the age of 12 and another 10.2% came here before their 18th birthday. 
This means that over half of the sample – and therefore also a large number of the persons with 
migration backgrounds – were socialised in Switzerland during their childhood and two-thirds during 
their youth. The frequently used term ‘home-grown’ therefore also applies to the majority of radicalisation 
cases in Switzerland. 
The information on the regional origin of the families of the persons concerned is also interesting. 32.3% 
of the persons recorded have roots in the former Yugoslavia, 20.8% in North African countries and 
15.4% in Middle Eastern countries. A small proportion also have a migration background from countries 
in Asia (Middle East) (8.5%) and sub-Saharan Africa (4.6%), see fig. 3. Considering that 57% of all 
Muslims in Switzerland come from the former Yugoslavia37, radicalised persons with family connections 
 
35 Federal Intelligence Service (2018b). Jihadist-motivated travel – figures for November 2018. https://www.vbs.ad-
min.ch/de/themen/nachrichtenbeschaffung/dschihadreisende.html 
36 The data in its anonymised form does not allow more specific statements to be made about the national origin of the families in 
the respective cases. This means that further differentiation according to ethnic affiliation, which can be very heterogene-
ous in the case of the Balkans for example, is not possible. The authors are also aware that people can often be of multi-
ethnic origin, especially in pluralistic societies. However, as the database for this variable only ever shows one attribute, 
differentiated analysis for this purpose is unfortunately not possible. 




to the Balkans – minus the converts from Western and Southern Europe – are under-represented in the 
sample. Persons from the Balkans are nevertheless the most frequently represented group. In line with 
the general geographical distribution of the Bosnian and Kosovan diaspora in Switzerland, a large 
number38 of the persons from the Balkans in the sample live in German-speaking Switzerland, followed 
by the Lake Geneva region. While a remarkably high number of persons with roots in the Middle East 
live in German-speaking Switzerland, persons of North African origin predominantly live in French-
speaking Switzerland and, in particular, in the Lake Geneva region (see table 1). 
 
Fig. 3: Regions of origin of jihadist-radicalised persons   
 
Origin Linguistic region Broad region 
Former Yugoslavia 69% German-speaking Switzerland 
31% French-speaking Switzerland 
31% Lake Geneva region 
21% Zurich 
North Africa 82% French-speaking Switzerland 59% Lake Geneva region 
30% Central Plain 
Central and Southern 
Europe 
57% German-speaking Switzerland 
35% French-speaking Switzerland 
26% Lake Geneva region 
26% Zurich 
Middle East 80% German-speaking Switzerland 
20% French-speaking Switzerland 
30% North-western Switzerland 
20% Zurich 
20% Central Switzerland 
Total 54% German-speaking Switzerland 
42% French-speaking Switzerland 
32% Lake Geneva region 
20% Central Plain 
16% Zurich 
Table 1: Regional distribution of jihadist-radicalised persons by origin 
3.2.3 Social context 
Despite the incomplete data set, it is evident that some of the persons analysed have been faced with 
a number of social problems over the course of their lives. Around 27 of 41 persons (66%) grew up in 
 
38 Iseni, Bashkim et al (2014). The population from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Switzerland. State Secretariat for Migration and 
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. https://www.sem.admin.ch/dam/data/sem/publiservice/publikatio-
nen/diaspora/diasporastudie-bosnien-d.pdf; Burri Sharani, Barbara et al (2010). The Kosovan population in Switzerland. 





dysfunctional or at least problematic family circumstances. In most of these cases the parents are 
separated, but in some cases there are also indications of domestic violence. The analysis of the family 
situation also revealed that 22 of 52 (42%) had experienced the loss of a family member or other persons 
close to them. Most frequently the father (seven cases) had died, the mother or both parents (three 
cases each). In the case of four other individuals we had information indicating that they had lost a 
sibling during childhood and two had experienced the death of their own child.  
The data also indicates that 29 other persons were faced with various life crises, such as separation 
from their partner, impending deportation, illness or loss of employment. In some cases the life crises 
occurred shortly before radicalisation. It may be assumed that dealing with the death of someone close 
to them causes people to reflect on their own life and to question its meaning, making them more open 
to new world views. However, a fragile identity can also be caused by other social problems and these 
factors are often interrelated. There was information about drug use on 69 of the 130 persons in total, 
22 of whom used drugs (mostly soft) regularly. There were indications that 33 persons had experienced 
frustration due to their private, professional or family situation. 27 of 31 persons, about whom information 
exists, experienced discrimination during the course of their life which presumably makes them 
potentially more susceptible to the victim narrative propagated by jihadists.39 Finally, 29 of 74 persons, 
about whom information exists, showed signs of psychiatric problems. These ranged from common 
psychiatric problems, such as learning difficulties, ADHD, a lack of impulse control, instability and 
depression, to severe psychiatric illnesses, such as schizophrenia and suicidal tendencies, which 
required inpatient or outpatient treatment. Psychiatric problems should probably generally be regarded 
more as the consequence of the social context rather than the cause of radicalisation. At least most 
psychological studies refute the assumption that extremists often have psychiatric illnesses.40 
In recent years, criminality was a social problem to which special attention was paid in research on 
terrorism as a ‘crime-terror nexus’. This theory is based on a combination of criminal and radical milieus 
where a person’s criminal past can influence the process of radicalisation.41 However, in the case of 
Switzerland at least, there is not enough evidence for this theory. In our sample, a quarter of the persons 
had committed criminal offences prior to their radicalisation and 16% had served a custodial sentence. 
Only few of them were imprisoned repeatedly or for several years and there is little evidence of 
radicalisation processes which began or took place in the prison system. It is interesting to take a closer 
look at the type of offences where, in addition to property and drugs offences, cases of bodily harm are 
predominant. With regard to the latter, it is evident that 36 of 60 persons for whom this information is 
available have experienced violence during the course of their life, whereby half were perpetrators and 
the other half victims of acts of war or domestic violence. 
3.2.4 Radicalisation factors 
In addition to the push factors described above, the data also allows us to make statements on possible 
pull factors in radicalisation, such as extremist propaganda, preachers, mosques, groups or missionary 
work (Dawah). Contrary to the position often expressed in public debate that Islam per se represents a 
radicalisation factor, the results of some studies42, which consider individual religiousness to perform a 
secondary function as a pull factor, also seem to apply to the Swiss context. In comparison to the entire 
 
39 Aarten, Pauline G. M. (2017). The Narrative of Victimization and Deradicalization: An Expert View. Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 41:557-572. 
40 Horgan, John (2008). From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into 
Terrorism. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618: 80-94; Weenink, Anton W. (2015). Behavioral 
Problems and Disorders among Radicals in Police Files. Perspectives on Terrorism 9/2: 17-33. http://www.terrorismana-
lysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/416/html. 
41 Basra, Rajan and Peter R. Neumann (2018). Crime as Jihad: Developments in the Crime-Terror Nexus in Europe. CTC Sentinel 
10/9: 1-6. https://ctc.usma.edu/crime-as-jihad-developments-in-the-crime-terror-nexus-in-europe/. 




Muslim population, the 20% of converts are overrepresented in the sample43. Of the 34 cases of persons 
with Muslim roots for which we have information on the religious family background, five persons grew 
up in secular family homes, 14 in liberal, eight in observant and only seven in fundamentalist (but not 
necessarily jihadist) ones. Only seven of 59 persons for whom information is available underwent a form 
of education in Islamic theology. 
Both in media coverage and in academic research, jihadist propaganda online has received increasing 
attention in recent years as a potentially significant radicalisation factor44 as it creates low-threshold 
access to extremist ideology. The FIS also underlines that the consumption of such online content plays 
a significant role in jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland.45 In the group of persons we analysed, this 
applied almost definitely to 21 of 50 (42%), probably to another 18 (36%) and not at all to 11 persons. 
However, extremism researchers largely agree that the consumption of IS propaganda videos and 
speeches by radical preachers online alone rarely leads to radicalisation. A study on the dissemination 
of extremist views among Swiss young people recently indicated that 31% of young Muslims had 
previously consumed Salafist or jihadist media content, but only 2.8% agreed with extremist items 
(Manzoni et al 2018).  
Furthermore, these cases of ‘online radicalisation’ do not occur in isolation, but are influenced in 
particular by social contacts in the milieu in the real world. With regard to the results concerning contact 
with Salafist preachers, of note is the extremely low number of persons, just 35 of 130 in total, for whom 
relevant data exists. Four-fifths of these 35 persons were in contact with Salafist preachers, some of 
whom, according to the FIS, were recruiting supporters for jihad.46 Interestingly, these preachers mainly 
come from neighbouring countries, like Mirsad Omerovic from Vienna or Bilal Bosnic from the Balkans. 
This also illustrates the transnational network of the Swiss scene, but also the clear lack of its own 
prominent preachers with far-reaching religious authority in the milieu. Further evidence of cross-border 
links in the various linguistic regions is the joint missionary activities, known as ‘Dawah’, in which at least 
29 of 99 persons from the database took part, such as the distribution of the Koran through the ‘Lies!’ 
campaign in several Swiss cities, which was also initially organised by activists from southern Germany.  
The social contacts in the jihadist milieu, which had a major influence in the radicalisation of our sample, 
were primarily made through peers: 93 of 97 persons were influenced by people of the same age from 
their personal environment during their radicalisation. For most of the 45 people for whom we have 
detailed information on the nature of these ‘strong links’ it was individual (11) or even several friends 
(25). In five further cases, which exclusively concerned women, the partners had a major influence on 
their radicalisation. These results correlate to some extent with social and religious studies on political 
activism47 and religious conversion,48 both of which are channelled, in particular, through the personal 
social networks of potential supporters. These research results and our data suggest that jihadist 
 
43 Estimates from the Swiss Centre for Islam and Society (SZIG) in 2016 indicate there are between 8,000 and 11,000 converts 
in Switzerland, which equates to 1% to 2% of the Muslim population: file:///C:/Users/eser/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Win-
dows/INetCache/Content.Outlook/GSSW70FL/A5_SZIG_Themenheft_4_D_FINAL_WEB%20(002).pdf 
 
44 Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander and Nick Kaderbhai (2017). Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A Literature Re-
view, 2006-2016. VOX-Pol Network of Excellence. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ICSR-Paper_Research-
Perspectives-on-Online-Radicalisation-A-Literature-Review-2006-2016.pdf. 
45 Federal Intelligence Service (2018c). Sicherheit Schweiz: Lagebericht 2018 des Nachrichtendienstes des Bundes. 
https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/52215.pdf. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Nepstad, Sharon Erickson (2004). Persistent Resistance: Commitment and Community in the Plowshares Movement. Social 
Problems 51(1): 43-60; Kotler-Berkowitz, Laurence (2005). Friends and Politics: Linking Diverse Friendship Networks to 
Political Participation. In: Alan S. Zuckerman (ed.). The Social Logic of Politics. Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 
152-170. 
48 et al. Stark, Rodney and William Sims Bainbridge (1980). Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cults and 
Sects. American Journal of Sociology 85 (6): 1376–95; Barker, Eileen (1984). The Making of a Moonie: Choice or Brain-
washing? Oxford: Blackwell Publishers; Coleman, James S. (1988). Free Riders and Zealots: The Role of Social Net-




radicalisation and religious conversion are generally a long-term process and the phenomenon of ‘blitz 
radicalisation’ is the exception. Only three of 82 persons from the sample were radicalised in less than 
three months, five in less than six months and 15 in less than 12 months. For 72%, radicalisation took 
over a year. The persons concerned often experience personality changes during this process (54 of 61 
cases). They not only spend time with old and new social contacts in the radical milieu, but often also 
isolate themselves from friends, acquaintances and family members who do not share their new 
ideological convictions (24 of 38) and increasingly shut themselves off in their radicalised groups. 
3.2.5 Activities 
Unfortunately, the data available does not permit a representative picture of the nature of the 
involvement in jihadist activities in Switzerland or abroad, but at least provides an indication that the 
legitimisation of violence does not necessarily lead to a propensity for violence or even terrorist attacks. 
Around two-thirds (36 of 53) of the persons in the database primarily came to the attention of the security 
services due to support activities, the majority of which were of a propagandist nature (58%). Most of 
these persons came to the attention of the intelligence service between 2013 and 2015. 
In comparison to some other European countries, departure to join jihadist groups fighting in conflict 
zones is relatively new in Switzerland, although arguably no less urgent an issue. In relation to the total 
population, Switzerland has a much higher ratio of jihadist-motivated travellers than Italy, for example, 
and a slightly lower ratio than Germany, but is not as severely affected by the problem as France, 
















Belgium 41350 11.4 36.2 0.9 4.6 
Germany 105051 82.8 12.7 5.0 2.1 
France 191052 67.1 28.5 5.7 3.4 
Italy 12553 60.6 2.1 2.9 0.4 
Austria 30054 8.8 34.1 0.6 5.0 
Switzerland 77 8.4 9.2 0.5 1.5 
Table 2:  A comparison of jihadist-motivated travellers from selected European countries 
 
49 Hackett, Conrad (2017). 5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe. PEW Research Center. November, 29. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/  
50 Scherrer, Amandine (Hrsg.) (2018). The return of foreign fighters to EU soil. European Parliament.  http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU(2018)621811_EN.pdf. 
 
51 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (2018). Islamistisch motivierte Reisebewegungen in Richtung Syrien/Irak. 18. Dezember. 
https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/zahlen-und-fakten-is-
lamismus/zuf-is-reisebewegungen-in-richtung-syrien-irak. 
52 Scherrer, Amandine (Hrsg.) (2018). The return of foreign fighters to EU soil. European Parliament.  http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU(2018)621811_EN.pdf. 
53 Vidino, Lorenzo und Marone Francesco (2017). The Jihadist Threat to Italy: A Primer. Italian Institute For International Political 
Studies. 13. November. https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/jihadist-threat-italy-primer-18541 
54 54 Van Ginkel, Bibi und Eva Entenmann (Hrsg.) (2016). The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. International 






With the exception of a few persons who travelled to Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia to join al-Qaida-
related groups, there were hardly any departures from Switzerland before 2010. The recent ‘wave of 
departures’ did not begin until 2013 and is directly related to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and the 
emergence of the ‘Islamic State’ in Syria and Iraq. The vast majority of jihadist-motivated travellers from 
Switzerland joined the ‘Islamic State’ group and chose Syria or Iraq as their destination. Only in isolated 
cases did they join the ranks of other jihadist rebel groups, such as the ‘Nusra Front’ or ‘Jaish al-Fatah’. 
Eight persons from the sample joined ‘al-Shabaab’ in Somalia. There was a significant increase in 
jihadist-motivated travellers from Switzerland, particularly in the years 2014 and 2015, when IS took on 
quasi-state characteristics and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared a “caliphate”.  The imminent 
collapse of the “caliphate” and the increased difficulty in relocating to Syria presumably led to a 
significant fall in travellers over the following two years, including from Switzerland. The FIS has not 
recorded any departures to Syria or Iraq since 2016. Although one person joined the offshoot of the 
‘Islamic State’ group in the Philippines in 2017, the data does not currently provide any indication of 
developments of departure trends to other conflict zones that would be comparable with the Syrian civil 
war. 
Only in the case of half of the 30 persons in our database for whom we had relevant information was it 
observed that they were active fighters for the ‘Islamic State’ group or other organisations. It must be 
underlined that ‘civil’ or less important military activities, such as guard duty or support activities for 
jihadist organisations abroad, are taken into account, but no more specific information on the role of 
‘non-combatants’ can be provided based on the data available, which is also generally difficult to verify 
and could be provided as self-serving claims. 
According to the FIS official statement,55 at least 31 Swiss jihadist-motivated travellers are highly likely 
or are presumed to have been killed abroad, most of them in Syria or Iraq (27). A further 16 persons 
have returned to Switzerland in recent years, while others have been imprisoned by Kurdish security 
forces in Northern Syria. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The evaluation of the FIS data indicates the individual, psychosocial and socio-demographic 
backgrounds of persons classified as being radicalised jihadists. Here extensive correlations with 
studies from neighbouring countries are observed, such as the fact that jihadist radicalisation mainly 
concerns men aged between 18 and 35 who are second-generation immigrants56 socialised in 
Switzerland, live in urban or suburban areas and tend to have a low level of education and to be poorly 
integrated into the employment market. As in other European states, converts are disproportionately 
highly represented amongst jihadist-radicalised persons, accounting for around a fifth. As also observed 
in Germany and France, it seems that the consumption of applicable content on the internet also plays 
an important supporting role in Switzerland, but is only a sufficient criterion for radicalisation alone in 
very few cases. Instead, group-dynamic influential factors through like-minded peers and recruiters also 
play a key role in Switzerland. Switzerland is not an exception in terms of the proportion of radicalised 
persons in relation to the total population either – it stands at a similar level to that in Germany, while 
Italy lies below it and France above it. The fact that around 40% of the persons analysed depend on 
state support (welfare benefits, unemployment benefits, invalidity insurance or refugee assistance) 
raises questions about their possible distancing from society, the social work approach to these persons 
and their economic and social reintegration opportunities. 
 
55 FIS 2018b. 





4 Overview and challenges in detention  
Author: Mallory Schneuwly Purdie 
4.1 Introduction    
The issue of radicalisation in prisons has been written about extensively (Neumann 2010, Mulcahy 2009, 
Trujillo 2009, Garapon et al. 2016). As places containing multiple vulnerabilities and frustrations 
(emotional, psychological, physical and spiritual etc.), prisons can be an environment conducive to 
radicalisation. According to one prison director in Switzerland, “Prison is a place where people can 
develop negative thoughts and can be radicalised in a very general sense – hate for society, 
reinforcement of criminal attitudes etc. Inmates can also have a reciprocal negative influence on one 
another.” The paths of Kelkal, Merah, Coulibaly, the Kouachi brothers (France) and Reid and Muktar 
Ibrahim (United Kingdom) are often used as prime examples. Promiscuity, the closed environment in 
terms of social relationships, the control of communication and information, the importation of pre-prison 
alliances, the transposition of a pre-existing identity problem to the prison context and social 
discontinuity imposed by incarceration are factors which, combined with the aforementioned 
vulnerabilities, contribute towards making prisons an environment conducive to radical representations 
of the world and behaviours. Ouisa Kies remarked: “Prison seems to be a fertile breeding ground 
because it’s a violent environment.” The French sociologist nevertheless qualifies its impact by 
underlining the importance “of looking at the pre-prison period and observing the paths with violence 
suffered earlier.” (Kies 2016). Farhad Khosrokhavar adds that while the process of radicalisation in 
western prisons exists, it does not constitute radicalisation on a large scale, but more a situation 
concerning small groups.  Cells rarely exceed two or three people, a strategy that allows them to remain 
under the radar of the surveillance authorities (2013, p. 288).  
 
4.2 The challenge of ‘radicalisation in prison’ 
What does ‘radicalisation in prison’ mean?  On the ground, the phrase covers various situations. 
- The process of cognitive and behavioural acceptance (Hafez and Mullins, p. 961) of a set of 
radical ideas in prison. 
- The imprisonment and management of persons sentenced for common law offences 
radicalised upon entry. 
- The management of persons detained and convicted for violation of federal law prohibiting the 
groups ‘Al-Qaïda’ or ‘Islamic State’ (SR 122) or supporting a criminal organisation (art 260ter 
SCC). 
These three positions cannot be explored within the limited scope of this exploratory study. Academic 
research on the processes of being radicalised in prison would require long-term work on the ground 
within the establishments and the collection of extensive ethnographic material. At a time when the first 
sentences for violation of SR 122 or article 260ter SCC are being pronounced and when there is heated 
political and media debate about the repatriation of ‘Swiss jihadists’, it was decided to focus on the third, 
and, to a lesser extent, the second aspect. This chapter nevertheless has two objectives: on the one 
hand, to provide information on the impact that accommodating persons incarcerated for violating SR 
122 and article 260ter SCC as well as persons identified as radical from the perspective of their world 
view (Wilkinson 2018) has on the day-to-day running of prisons. On the other, as the role of 
imams/Muslim chaplains in prison is often a topic of debate, it also aims to outline the views of the 
directors on the benefits and drawbacks of such collaboration and to obtain the views of the imams and 




4.3 Methodological approach 
To meet these objectives, semi-structured interviews with five categories of person were carried out: 
1) Prison directors 
2) Heads of security 
3) Christian chaplains 
4) Imams or Muslim chaplains 
5) Extern experts (criminologist, federal prosecutor) 
The sample of persons interviewed was compiled using a multifaceted approach. Firstly, the prison 
directors dealing with the incarceration of detainees suspected of violating SR 122 or article 260ter SCC 
were contacted. Secondly, the names of prisons faced with situations involving radical profiles were 
provided by the interviewed professionals to us. Thirdly, the prison imams/Muslim chaplains were 
contacted. 
Finally, 15 persons performing various roles in 18 establishments in seven different cantons (3 in the 
French-speaking part and 4 in the German-speaking part) were interviewed between December 2018 
and February 2019. Establishments dealing with pre-sentencing detention, custody on remand, short 
custodial sentences and execution of sentences are represented. Most of the establishments 
accommodate men (12), some of which have a section for women (3), two are establishments for women 
and one for minors.  
Prison directors 6 
Heads of security  2 
Christian chaplains 2 
Imams or Muslim chaplains 4 
Extern experts 3 
Total 17 
Table 3: Overview of the number of prison system experts interviewed 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts: 
1. The first underlines the challenges presented by the presence of radicalised inmates for day-
to-day management, combining the views of the directors and heads of security. 
2. The second focuses on the role of imams/chaplains in the establishments. Seen as potential 
agents of radicalisation by some and actors in prevention by others, the aim is to outline how 
they themselves see their position and role in the institutions. 
4.4 Swiss prisons faced with jihadist radicalisation 
While this exploratory study does not seek to discuss what the category ‘jihadist’ covers, it nevertheless 
seems necessary to differentiate between what concerns the cultural practices of Muslim inmates and 
that which characterises a radical or jihadist attitude or world view. (Almost) daily prayers, participation 
in the Friday sermon or prayers, fasting for a day or a month (Ramadan), a beard, a chechia or a qamis57 
are religious practices (prayers and fasting) or cultural customs related to practice. None of these 
practices or customs constitutes a radical experience, even if they can, depending on the circumstances, 
 
57 A head covering and a long tunic which extends to just above the ankles worn by some Muslims (in Europe and in countries 




constitute indicators. However, the presence of Muslim inmates is sometimes very high in Swiss prisons: 
in 2016, for example, the faith of 43% of inmates in prisons in the canton of Vaud was Muslim (Canton 
of Vaud prison service, 2016, p. 74). This socio-demographic situation is relatively recent and presents 
a large number of questions and challenges in terms of the actual organisation of freedom of conscience 
and religious worship for the directors, the security personnel and the Christian chaplains (Schneuwly 
Purdie 2013). The indicators of radicalisation are instead found in attitudes and relationships with others 
(in the wider sense), such as strict opposition between an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, complete rejection of the 
democratic system, an exclusive allegiance to a higher law because it is divine, a dehumanisation of 
‘other people’, discrediting the institutional actors of Islam or religious justification of violence. Such 
indicators clearly require a more subtle understanding than a claimed affiliation to a religious sub-
system, such as Salafism for example (Khosrokavar 2018, Crettiez and Ainine 2017). It is also a 
challenge identified by one director interviewed. He said: “It is very difficult to monitor all the activities, 
relationships and behaviours of an inmate. Some can seem completely normal in their relationships with 
other people and eat pork, but still become radicalised behind our backs. You can’t pick everything up. 
However, if they are stupid enough to walk around barefoot, pray all day long and not talk about anything 
else but Allah, then of course they will be noticed. But if the process is subtle, secret and takes place in 
a sophisticated way, we have no chance.” (Dir1, 20.12.2018). While the affirmation of a strict or 
fundamentalist religious identity and the entry into a process of radicalisation leading to violence cannot 
be correlated statistically, suspicions and fears are still very prevalent on the ground. Assertions related 
to religion are today often read through the prism of radicalisation and cast a shadow, sometimes a dark 
one, over inmates of Muslim faith. The agents are aware of and admit their lack of knowledge on the 
subject, their difficulty in finding useful information for their professional practice and certain shortcuts 
that these shortcomings can sometimes lead to. 
To understand the scale and indicators of such a complex phenomenon extending beyond the scope of 
this study, the text below focuses on the actual experience of the establishments with the day-to-day 
management of inmates (already) known for their radicalisation (in particular those imprisoned for 
violation of SR 122 or article 260ter SCC). According to the respondents to this study, the challenges 
vary significantly between pre-sentencing detention establishments and execution-of-sentence 
institutions. For the first, it is the securing and separation of the inmate for the purposes of investigation 
and procedures that take priority. As one director said, the pre-sentencing detention institutions are “at 
the start of the chain, our role is not therapeutic and we are not responsible for 
resocialisation measures.” (Dir2 21.02.2019). For the second group, the equation is more complex – as 
well as ensuring the conditions for execution of sentence (punishment) and the security of the prison, 
they also have to implement resocialisation measures. 
4.5 Challenges of pre-sentencing detention  
The prison directors interviewed are unanimous: on the one hand, they are aware that the risk of 
radicalisation in prison is real, but, on the other, even when faced with inmates with radical potential, 
they evaluate this risk as being relatively low in the pre-sentencing detention establishments. Their 
arguments are based on two main reasons.  
1. On the one hand, the inmates (independently of suspicion of radicalisation) are held in a high 
degree of” isolation”58.  
 
58  The term “isolation” does not indicate a strict regime of isolation disaccording with the guidelines of the penal system and with 
humanrights (see European Committee of Crime Problems/ Council for Penological Co-operaton 2016; Guide of the Eu-
ropean Council for the penal and probation services regarding the radicalisation and extremist violence 2016, p. 34-35), 
but a limitation of the contacts with co-prisoners and external persons (especially regarding the communication). The 





2. On the other, there is significant turnover of prisoners between different sectors of the same 
prison and between penal institutions.  
Contact between inmates is therefore kept to a minimum as is any exposure time between two inmates. 
One of the directors indicated that separation measures had actually been stepped up and compensated 
for inmates imprisoned for suspicion of terrorism: “A minimal programme of activity and leisure was put 
in place. We nevertheless tried to reduce the psychological pressure by organising two daily visits to the 
yard and access to sporting activities.” (Dir2 19.02.2019). 
The directors also pay attention to placement in cells. They take account of the number of inmates 
imprisoned in the same aisle and their profiles. The preventative measures also include increased 
control of any communications, visits and material read. One director mentioned an occasion when he 
suspected radicalisation: “It started with a book (with Salafist content) and complaints from fellow 
inmates who said they had been threatened when they went to see the Christian chaplain. This inmate 
also had a follower who distanced himself when he noticed that we were watching him.” (Dir5, 
25.01.2019). The directors also pay special attention to the external inaccessibility of the cell: for urban 
prisons, for example, this means that the windows of the cell cannot look out over the street. The 
surveillance of the sky, particularly due to drones flying over prisons, presents new security challenges 
in general. 
The presence of detainees and persons convicted on terrorism charges also poses an internal security 
challenge. One director said: “It is better if the fellow inmates are unaware that a prisoner amongst them 
has a terrorist background. If this information gets around, there is a high risk that this person will 
become the target of threats from other inmates.” (Dir2 19.02.2019). Another director also admitted 
sometimes being concerned about the external security of personnel, if an accomplice or follower should 
find out where an inmate was being kept.  
4.6 From security to resocialisation - the challenges during imprisonment 
The period of detention, the relative freedom of movement in a secure perimeter and the opportunity to 
establish contacts and form relationships with other inmates have more serious consequences for the 
management of radicalised inmates during imprisonment. The number of inmates radicalised upon entry 
or convicted for violation of SR 122 or article 260ter SCC is currently still low. According to the director 
of a large prison in the German-speaking part of Switzerland, their internal monitoring unit observes the 
presence of two to three cases on average. He believes this figure is relatively constant (Dir1). Dir5 said 
that Islamist radicalisation is not a significant issue in prisons in the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland. He added that they are vigilant about all forms of extremism, in particular the Grey 
Wolves59, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Tamil Tigers and eco-terrorism. This establishment 
is also equipped with a coordination unit for matters related to various forms of extremism. Another 
director took a more nuanced view of the phenomenon. He believes that while radical indications remain 
limited quantitatively, they are significant in the actual management of prisoners qualitatively. He 
compared some radicalised inmates with ‘black boxes’, intelligent people who stay under the radar and 
for whom interdisciplinary monitoring is vital (Dir6). He believes the difficulty of evaluating an inmate in 
prison is much greater upon departure, particularly in the absence of a probation plan. 
There are challenges in the prison system and the directors take measures concerning external 
communication, on the one hand, but above all with regard to the type of detention. In contrast to the 
pre-sentencing detention establishments surveyed, the execution-of-sentence establishments included 
in our survey do not adopt a policy of particular separation of the inmates concerned. They favour the 
separation model, which means inserting the person into a limited group of fellow inmates whose profile 
 




is analysed beforehand. The aim is to restrict contact between the inmate known for radicalisation with 
prisoners who could share their worldview and fragile inmates who could be influenced by their charisma 
or ideas: “We put a monitoring system in place. We monitor the various persons and can inform 
colleagues in various fields: social care, security and the chaplaincy, in particular the imam. This means 
everyone is aware of any changes in a person’s behaviour or the atmosphere in a sector.” (Dir1, 
20.12.2018). This form of detention ensures better respect for human rights (Neumann 2010; European 
Council 2016). It also helps to minimise the inmate’s opportunities to advance a victim narrative 
conducive to radicalisation. According to Silke and Velduis (2017)60, separation, without isolation or 
concentration, can also have a positive impact on the person sentenced. Contact with fellow inmates 
who do not share their worldview can also contribute towards disengagement. Current experience 
indicates that the organisation of the prison around this type of inmate is manageable. One director sees 
organisation into small units of life, combined with a high level of supervision and an appropriate 
framework, as a prevention measure. She believes: “The possibility of somebody becoming radicalised 
without anyone noticing is relatively low.” However, she adds: “If somebody really gets caught up in 
radicalisation, there is not a great deal we can do to stop it. We will nevertheless be close to them and 
can attempt to intervene through targeted sessions or meetings with the chaplain. But I don’t know how 
we would manage the phenomenon if more than two or three people were involved.” (Dir4, 11.02.2019). 
This view is shared by another director who added: “It’s manageable with one or two. You can set up 
special groups and make sure they don’t associate with and encourage one another. If there are more 
than five, you cannot keep such a close eye on them all.” (Dir1, 20.12.201).  
4.7 Experience on the ground 
Apart from close monitoring of the person, their relationships and the challenges presented by their 
detention in the institution, the everyday life of inmates imprisoned for violation of SR 122/article 260ter 
SCC or who were radicalised before entering prison does not differ from that of other inmates. They are 
obliged to work, have the same free time and the same access to sporting and leisure activities.  
While one director pointed out that the inmates he had encountered tended to keep themselves to 
themselves and did not easily form relationships with fellow inmates, one head of security indicated that 
this type of inmate is difficult to integrate into the prison population. He remarked: “Some tend to perform 
a missionary role which provokes strong rejection from fellow inmates. Others seek to isolate themselves 
from ‘non-believers’. We’ve had some radicalised inmates who have completely renounced the 
consumption of media to dedicate themselves entirely to God. This self-exclusion from social circles, 
but also the environmental context makes resocialisation difficult, if not impossible.” (Head of security 
1, 20.12.2018). This attitude of withdrawal can sometimes also be explained by a lack of language skills 
or psychiatric problems. 
4.7.1 A difficult relationship 
One director noted that it had been difficult to distinguish between psychiatric problems and religious 
radicalisation. She outlined the major difficulties experienced in communicating with one of the people 
convicted for supporting the activities of a terrorist group due, in particular, to great mistrust of anyone 
who represented the state (conspiracy theory) and a very strong victim narrative: “There was complete 
distrust upon arrival. We were clearly the representatives of the state which wanted to destroy her and 
only sought to do her harm... Only Allah was on her side. We were all enemies.” (Dir4, 11.02.2019). 
4.7.2 Religious practice 
 




Research shows that Islam (the religion in general) can play a significant role at various points in the 
prison experience (Beckford and Khosrokavar 2006; Becci et al. 2009; Béraud, de Galembert, Rostaing 
2016, Sarg, Lamine 2011; Schneuwly Purdie 2014). In some cases, this practice can be (or become) 
demonstrative. For others, it is more confined and discreet. With regard to the manifestation of religious 
practice, there is great disparity between the establishments. In some, prison officers have witnessed 
recurrent calls to prayer through cell windows, the organisation of clandestine collective prayers and 
complaints over failure to respect religious norms concerning food. In others, such events are the 
exception. When reading the data collected as part of this exploratory study, three approaches may help 
to explain these divergences: the socio-demographic characteristics of the inmates (age, status, national 
origin), the degree of organisation of cultural practices in prison (organisation of prayers, celebration of 
festivals) and regular access to an imam or Muslim chaplain (particularly one-to-one sessions). 
However, the time available for this exploratory study did not allow us to examine these three aspects 
in depth.  
 
The following paragraphs will therefore only describe the religious visibility of detainees and persons 
convicted for violation of SR 122/article 260ter SCC. In the view of the directors concerned, the 
radicalised inmates who they have held conducted themselves discreetly, including in their religious 
practices. To their knowledge, they had not taken part in the Friday prayers that some establishments 
organise at regular intervals and had not met with the prison’s imam (where such a service is available). 
The same observation was made by the Muslim chaplains interviewed. Only one of the persons 
interviewed had been in contact with a person convicted of violating SR 122. This had been informal 
contact without any connection to a religious matter or practice when they met within the perimeter of 
the prison. Imam2 believes that radicalised inmates do not speak with them because they consider them 
to be traitors who are working for the authorities. One director also said that when she offered to put an 
inmate in touch with a representative of a Muslim association for a personal meeting, she had laughed 
and said that they were not true Muslims. The directors believe that these inmates have kept up their 
religious practices, in particular praying and reading the Koran, in their cells. They have not observed 
proselytising or extraordinary requests for religious purposes. At first glance, it would seem the sets of 
beliefs of this type of inmate have not had an impact on the everyday working life of prison staff. 
However, a longer period of imprisonment or an increase in the number of inmates sharing the same 
ideology or propagating the same conspiracy theories and victim narratives could create a breeding 
ground for recruitment of other inmates. 
4.8 After prison 
The issue of resocialisation is only dealt with to a small extent by pre-sentencing detention 
establishments. As one director said: “We’re at the start of the chain. Our role is not therapeutic and we 
are not responsible for resocialisation measures.” (Dir2, 21.02.2019). Another interviewee took a more 
nuanced view: “in the event of extended pre-sentencing detention, working on resocialisation would 
seem necessary. On the one hand, to minimise the damage caused by imprisonment, and, on the other, 
to increase the safety of the population.” (Head of security 1, 20.12.2018). This view is shared by Dir1 
who believes the planning of resocialisation should begin as early as possible. Pre-sentencing detention 
was sometimes longer than the duration of the period of imprisonment. In such cases, it is difficult to set 
up implementable reintegration programmes. These observations concern the resocialisation of inmates 
in general and not the disengagement and reintegration of radicalised inmates inside or outside of 





1. Very little desire from this type of inmate to work either inside prison or upon release. They 
only show commitment to God and not to the state or the society. 
2. Little interest in thinking about their offence which they often do not see as a crime. They 
are often not interested in working on themselves, convinced that their actions serve a 
higher goal.  
3. Evaluation of the risks that encouraging the acquisition of new skills (in languages or 
multimedia) to persons who, once released, could use them against society by recruiting 
in the language learned or by propagating extremist material online. 
Various problems that are found in other types of prison population must also be mentioned: lack of a 
probation plan in the event of early release (fear of excessive detention), relevance of a resocialisation 
plan in the event of deportation, evaluation of outside network before approval and release and 
evaluation of level of danger.  
 
In conclusion, the risk of radicalisation in prison is a reality. An increase in such cases cannot be 
excluded. One director said: “The prison system reflects society. If radicalisation increases on the 
outside, we can assume that more people will be convicted and that it will then also increase inside 
prison. (…) We must also be aware that developments can occur explicitly within a prison.” (Dir2, 
21.02.2019). Some cases, most of which are isolated, slip under the radar of the internal security 
management systems in prisons. Some prison officers working at large prisons, which are often 
overpopulated, also indicated they had observed behaviour they deem radical or at least problematic. 
Calls to prayer from the windows of a prison, excessive proselytising behaviour, sometimes 
accompanied by threats, towards fellow Muslim prisoners and exclamations like ‘Allahu Akbar’ heard in 
attacks are some of the incidents that raised questions in their mind over the provocative or ideological 
nature of some inmates. 
However, it seems the small size of the Swiss prisons by international standards and the forms of 
management, which respect diversity and fundamental freedoms, constitute preventative measures in 
relation to radicalisation. Some directors said that the regular and institutional presence of a Muslim 
chaplain or imam also acted as a preventative measure. This is a moot point and this view is not shared 
by all the directors interviewed. 
4.9 Muslim chaplains and imams in prisons 
4.9.1 The views of the directors 
The more or less regular and institutionalised presence of a Muslim chaplain or imam is part of the 
challenge of managing not just radicalised inmates, but the spiritual guidance of Muslim inmates in 
general. The views of the directors interviewed are polarised: some see collaboration with an 
imam/Muslim chaplain as a specific prevention and detection measure. “We have an imam here. It’s a 
huge advantage. He has been coming here for 20 years. It’s a good partnership. He also supports us, 
for example, when we have questions about an inmate’s behaviour. He can also advise us on the 
approaches to adopt towards an inmate if something concerning happens.” (Dir2 21.02.2019). Another 
director believes the presence of an imam is a prison competence that should be established upstream 
of radicalisation issues: “I work with an imam. I see him three or four times a week. He practically lives 
here with his work. He’s a professional. It’s also important that we discuss matters on a professional 
level and share knowledge and experiences. When I talk to the imam about problems with Muslim 
inmates, he knows that I don’t have an issue with Islam as a religion or with him as a Muslim. We 




especially if they suddenly find themselves faced with the issue (of radicalisation). They will have to 
make up ground to deal with these situations. The imam is a necessary measure to gauge the climate 
and to discuss cases and concerns.” (Dir1, 20.12.2019). 
The difficulty of finding a person of trust who meets the wide range of socio-demographic profiles of the 
Muslim prison population (branches of religion, languages) is an obstacle for others. They fear that their 
presence will only heighten intra-community tensions. They also indicated that they do not know which 
theological criteria to apply when working with someone. They are waiting for state impetus to establish 
criteria allowing them to evaluate potential candidates. One director said: “I’m reluctant about the 
significant involvement of an imam because it would be difficult to choose one. For the Kurds, it couldn’t 
be a Turk, most of them receive guidance remotely from Turkey anyway. Then there’s also the issue of 
whether to work with a Sunni or Shia or an imam who speaks Albanian or Arabic. I would apply some 
basic requirements – that they had completed training in chaplaincy and that the prayers were said in 
German. We have two Christian chaplains here who work on an interdisciplinary basis. Some Muslim 
inmates turn to them.” (Dir5, 25.01.2019). It emerged from these interviews that the directors in favour 
of an imam/Muslim chaplain manage establishments that have been working with their Muslim partners 
for some years, often even before radicalisation became such a topical issue inside and outside of 
prison. For those who have not yet had positive experiences with imams/Muslim chaplains, the public 
debate about radicalisation, the training of imams and hate preachers present a significant obstacle in 
establishing trust and good working relationships. 
4.9.2 The views of the Muslim chaplains 
The four Muslim prison contact persons interviewed did not all have the same status in the 
establishments that they visit. The activities they conduct and their proximity to the inmates also vary a 
great deal from one prison to another (Schneuwly Purdie 2011). However, they all have over ten years 
of experience working in the prison system. Three of them work in more than one prison and the 
interviewees gained their experience in 12 prison institutions in five cantons (three in French-speaking 
Switzerland and two in German-speaking Switzerland). 
4.9.3 Radicalisation – a shrouded phenomenon 
The Muslim chaplains and imams interviewed share the view of the directors in our survey. Persons 
who are radicalised or demonstrate potentially radical behaviour are still exceptions, but there are cases 
and others could occur at any time: “Radicalisation is a shrouded phenomenon. It’s there without really 
being tangible. You can sense it, but under the surface. (…)  It’s there in the discussions that some 
inmates have and you pick it up through questions and some complaints.” (Imam3, 18.01.2019). This 
Muslim chaplain added that when an inmate associates imprisonment with a feeling of injustice in 
relation to his own history and religion, “the ingredients for radical thinking are there.” The imams and 
Muslim chaplains also observed that the phenomenon fluctuates depending on the context and, above 
all, on current international developments: “I would say it comes in waves and that depends on current 
developments to a great extent. I heard some rather alarming conversations after the Charlie Hebdo 
and Bataclan attacks, like “they got what they deserved.” That’s the moment when you have to confront 
them and tell them that if you claim to be a Muslim this is what it involves and to try to reframe 
things.” (Imam3, 18.01.2019). Neither naive nor alarmist, the respondents in this study are vigilant and 
are trying – within the scope of their role in prison – to contribute to the barometer of the general climate 






4.9.4 When international developments enter prison 
The interviewees said that questions about religious norms have been asked since they started. 
However, they have observed that over the past 12 years, inmates are asking them more questions 
about geopolitical developments in the world: Palestine, Afghanistan and, of course, Iraq and Syria. 
“The questions about what was going on in the world began in 2010. Do we have the right to fight against 
people who occupy our territory? Can you do this or that from a religious perspective? Is jihad being 
fought in Syria?” (Imam4, 09.01.2019). The Muslim contact persons in prison therefore anticipate and 
address issues related to current affairs in their preaching. They take advantage of these opportunities 
to provide another interpretation of the Koran to those put forward by the ideologists of groups 
associated with ‘Al Qaïda’ or ‘Islamic State’: “I like to ‘vaccinate’ the people who come to see me to 
prevent them from falling prey to others. To stop them from being targeted and manipulated. That’s why 
I try to take preventative steps, to ask burning questions and to address issues related to the 
international situation and current affairs. I try to provide clear and precise answers that set out values. 
Unequivocally condemning terrorist acts throughout the world underlines that killing innocent people is 
forbidden.” (Imam4, 09.01.2019). The clear condemnation, the re-framing of the arguments and putting 
texts into context are the main tools used by Muslim contact persons in prison as means of prevention.  
4.9.5 The dimensions of radicalisation 
The Muslim chaplains differentiate between those who they deem radical and those whose rhetoric or 
behaviour are sometimes extreme. They say the first group are exceptions. In 17 years of working in 
prisons, an imam indicated that he had rarely encountered very concerning cases which he had to refer 
to the director. In contrast, problematic rhetoric and behaviour are a constant. One imam, for example, 
said that there are Salafists in prison just as there are in free society. A reflection of society, both inside 
and outside of prison, he said that some people think that “if they wear a long beard, dress like the 
prophet Mohammed and pray more strictly than their fellow believers, they will go to paradise and that 
they are practising good Islam.” (Imam1, 20.12.2019). He nevertheless points out that such conduct is 
not an indication of violent behaviour or radical ideas and that care must be taken to avoid systematically 
associating Salafism with violence. Imam2 also observed the presence of inmates with Salafist 
tendencies, some of whom would have been in contact with an Islamic association run by converts in 
the outside world. 
Cases therefore exist but their number varies: one of the interviewees believes he encounters between 
three and five cases a year, while two other respondents said that there are always one or two people 
they keep a close eye on and who need a ‘vaccination’ (Imam4, 09.01.2019) or individual monitoring.61 
4.9.6 Some concerning indicators from the imams 
Religious practices, however devout, are not an indicator of radicalisation in the view of the Muslim 
chaplains. They see the combination of a victim narrative, a desire for revenge (or vengeance), a 
dichotomy of the world into ‘us Muslims’ versus ‘you’ and a legitimation of their ideas through religion as 
being a relevant indicator. One imam said: “one of the indicators is when an inmate starts to politicise 
their rhetoric and begins revengeful narrative in relation to the system and everything they have endured 
and they associate this with all the atrocities in the world and start saying things like ‘us Muslims’ etc. 
 
This discrepancy between the observations of the directors and the Muslim contact persons is explained, in particular, by the fact 
that the latter do not generally have access to all the inmates. They also visit the prisons intermittently, often for no more 




And it’s this narrative that I find concerning. When you start to look at things in a partisan way, everything 
seems unjust and you begin to see things as the prison system, the judge, the warders, the state, society 
and, of course, you the poor little believer who just wants to pray.” (Imam3, 09.01.2019). In relation to 
isolation and negative ideas, he added: “If people in prison stay in their cells and start to get very 
negative thoughts, they will be very radical. Because they don’t feel at ease inside, they regard 
themselves as victims of society and seek revenge. They see nothing but vengeance. Nothing else. All 
the texts are interpreted from the perspective of vengeance as their memory is reduced to revenge 
because there is injustice in the world and in their lives. (…) Their behaviour and their way of putting the 
texts into practice is all based on the notion of vengeance.” (Imam3, 09.01.2019). Imam2 indicated that 
frustration was an indicator: “There are inmates, but not just inmates, who are very disaffected. 
Frustration is the first stage in fanaticism. If that’s overlooked, people can become radicalised and turn 
into extremists. This energy put into radicalisation must be diverted into other things.” (Imam2, 
21.01.2019). He warns that “if someone is strict in terms of religion” they can also use religious 
arguments about the culpability of other people and legitimise a separation of society into ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Religion alone is therefore not a radicalisation factor in the view of the Muslim prison contact persons 
interviewed. It can nevertheless be used to frame arguments legitimising frustration, discontent or the 
desire for revenge. 
 
4.9.7 The Muslim chaplains as actors in prevention 
According to the Muslim prison contact persons, their presence and activities are essentially 
preventative and include answering questions of a religious nature, giving sermons that address the 
problems of society, reading, contextualising and explaining religious texts and de-constructing 
extremist interpretations. However, they also indicate that if the authorities expect them to counteract 
radicalisation, “they need to give them the resources. The work currently being done is good but not 
sufficient. Specialist and highly skilled imams working directly with persons who are at risk or fragile are 
required. (…) When the imam comes and holds sessions with small groups, he gains their trust, helps 
to resolve their problems and to address false views of religion and misguided interpretations of reality 
(…) the imam acts as an educator. They need a place and the opportunity to hold ongoing meetings 
with persons at risk. That takes time. It’s not a matter of one session and that’s it.” (Imam4, 09.01.2019). 
This correlates with what was said by Imam3 who, with the time he had available with the inmates, is 
not able to adequately assess the level of their knowledge or the development of rhetoric or concerning 
attitudes. He explained that he can conduct four individual 15-minute interviews a month with the 
inmates as part of his role. He is currently working with around 20 people: “I don’t think that’s enough to 
assess the level of danger or to set up personalised individual support. While these 15 minutes are 
important, they do not meet requirements and do not tackle the issues. In relation to potential 
radicalisation, posing a threat and dangerous narratives, they (potential recruiters) are a step ahead. If 
there is someone who propagates this kind of narrative, they may have five months ahead of them to 
sow the seeds before I can see the inmate again to answer the questions that somebody else had 
sown.” (Imam3, 18.01.2019). The proximity to and regularity of contact with an inmate enables a 
relationship of trust to be established which is vital if progress is to be made. Professional follow-up, 
including on religious matters, would enable measures to be put in place for release from prison: “You 
can also help the person to prepare for their release and find out the ideas that they’ll leave with. If they 
have dark ideas about society, which are legitimised by religion, and can progressively be identified with 
profiles that could turn.” (Imam4, 09.01.2019). He continued by suggesting: “that a permanent imam 
position in prison is required for several reasons. Religion – providing correct religious education for 




all of which are cultural aspects. Then there are all aspects associated with prevention and radicalisation 
at a psychological level. Some people feel worthless and radicalisation makes them feel valued. They 
say: 'I was nothing before but look what I’ve become now. I know the truth.' And that makes them feel 
good. It makes them feel that their life is of value. Before they weren’t recognised by society and now 
they are bringing the truth. That also has to be dealt with. ” 
The Muslim contact persons also underline that the organisation and management of Swiss prisons are 
preventative per se – the modulation of small-sized units, the structuring of time between work, training 
and leisure, efforts to make the inmates assume responsibility and the dignified treatment of inmates. 
Imam2 also believes that equal treatment applied independently of skin colour, language, nationality or 
religion is a preventative measure because it helps avert the development of a victim narrative. On this 
subject, Imam1 said: “The inmates are kept busy with work, continuing education, training courses, 
treatment, etc. The entire system is geared to ensuring they have practically no time to think about such 
matters. That’s the first thing. The second is that the imams are also there. The inmates need them. It 
means they can live here as Muslims. They can talk to us. As you’ve seen, prison takes account of 
special diet preferences, Ramadan and religious festivals. There are lessons on the Koran and Friday 
prayers. Everything is available.” (Imam1, 20.12.2019). These special arrangements can place a burden 
on prisons. However, according to the interviewees, they contribute towards reducing the sense of 
discrimination from which a victim and revenge narrative can develop. 
4.10 Conclusion 
The phenomenon of radicalisation exists in Swiss prisons, even if the cases are still negligible today for 
the establishments interviewed. The number of cases fluctuates depending on various parameters: 
international developments, the rise in the number of charges, overpopulation and the increase in victim 
narratives based on religious principles are a few examples. The directors are aware of this and are 
using various measures to address the situation: detection protocols, internal regulations, coordination 
positions for extremism issues, ongoing staff training and, for some, the presence of an imam or Muslim 
chaplain. 
At a time when the return of jihadist-motivated travellers and proven combatants is a topical issue, 
placement in prison establishments and cells, institutional and individual monitoring of radicalisation and 
risk management are areas where prisons still have work to do. As one director said, while the number 
of cases remains low, rotation between the floors or between prisons is still an effective management 
tool. However, an increase in such cases would require reflection from the partners on incarceration, 





5 Prevention and intervention 
Authors: Miryam Eser Davolio and Ayesha Rether 
5.1 Introduction 
The section of the study on prevention and intervention focuses on the extremism and bridge-building 
specialist units which – in cooperation with other specialist units (e.g. youth forensic service and the 
protection against violence service) – are taking preventative measures in the two key areas of ‘cases 
of radicalisation’ (extremism specialist units) and the ‘radicalisation context of the mosque’ (bridge-
building specialist units). They also represent two strategies which are set out in the NAP (2017) under 
measure 10 'Competence and advice centres for the issues of radicalisation and violent extremism' and 
measure 13 'Intensification of police networking.' Their resources, structural integration, approaches and 
procedures with regard to preventative activities are explained in more detail below. As well as the 
bridge-building specialist units, the cantonal and city integration specialist units for religious affairs 
(Canton of Basel-Stadt) also maintain contact with mosque associations and other religious 
communities, which means overlapping can occur here, that can be used positively in mutual exchange. 
In the field of prevention, there are other existing programmes, such as the project concerning counter-
narratives and alternative narratives of ‘youth and media’ of the Federal Social Insurance Office, which 
was evaluated (Baier et al. 2019), as well as local projects of NGOs, such as Tasamouh in Biel or JASS 
and TransEducation in the Zurich and Aargau region. This study focuses on the extremism and bridge-
building units integrated into administrative structures – such as in the core groups model (together with 
the specialist integration unit) in the case of the City of Winterthur – which are in close contact, allowing 
them to respond to questions and challenges as well as to problem situations at individual and 
community level promptly and in a coordinated way. 
5.2 Extremism specialist units 
5.2.1 Methodology 
A total of 12 interviews were conducted with all ten extremism specialist units (Geneva, Lausanne, Biel, 
city of Bern, Basel-Stadt, Aargau, city of Zurich and canton of Zurich, Winterthur and Lugano) on the 
existing personnel resources, the integration of the specialist unit, target groups, their consultation and 
case-work activities and their intervention strategies. The content of the written notes on the interviews 
was evaluated and sent back to the participants for review beforehand. 
5.2.2 Personnel resources and case volumes of the extremism specialist units 
While there were few extremism specialist units, except for in the two cities of Zurich and Bern, when 
jihadist-motivated travellers peaked in 2015 and this pioneering work was previously carried out across 
city and cantonal boundaries (see Eser Davolio et al. 2015), there are now specific consultation services 
in quite a number of cantons and cities (Geneva, Lausanne, Biel, Bern, Basel, the city and canton of 
Zurich, Winterthur and Lugano). These specialist units do not just provide advice and support for 
institutions and the public, but also perform a guidance role within administrations (threat management, 
knowledge transfer, networking, answering of parliamentary questions etc.) as well as public relations 
work (meetings, brochures, communication, media relations). At the newer specialist units, such as 
those in Lausanne, Biel and Lugano, the positioning and raising awareness of the point of contact is still 
in progress, while others already have a certain profile, clarity in relation to methods and networking 




available is complicated by the fact that the staff are not generally just responsible for and employed to 
deal with the issue of radicalisation. 
Since 2017 and 2018, a slight levelling-off of suspected cases and reports of Islamic extremism has 
been recorded at all specialist units (not the case with right-wing extremism, sects etc.), but reports of 
suspected cases continue to be received, albeit at a lower level than in 2014–16. In addition to the 
military defeat of IS in the Middle East, the reasons for this decline also include the wave-shaped pattern 
of public attention, which can increase sharply, for example, after attacks or due to current challenges, 
such as the issue of the returning fighters, but then ebbs away again. When public awareness of Islamic 
extremism is low, the actors in the field (teachers, school social workers, healthcare and asylum 
professionals) are less anxious and seek advice less frequently. 
Some specialist unit heads also believe that the awareness of professionals in their catchment area has 
been increased through targeted training on radicalisation processes and that suspected cases are 
being classified and responded to better as a result. It was also observed how quickly awareness of the 
issue in everyday life dwindles if the pressure is relaxed due to a lack of media presence. Even though 
alarmism is deemed completely counter-productive by the heads of the specialist units, they do not 
believe the risk potential has been eliminated, owing to the continued existence of the breeding ground. 
They also believe that social polarisation processes remain relevant with regard to both Islamism, on 
the one hand, and Islamophobia on the other. As far as the dissemination of extremist views amongst 
young people is concerned, in particular approval of jihadist radicalism, the representative study by 
Manzoni et al. (2018) produced results which prove the need for prevention and intervention. 
5.2.3 Target audience of the specialist units 
Half of the target audience of the specialist units is made up of the authorities, in particular school heads, 
teachers, social workers and asylum professionals, while the other half is composed of parents and 
other key persons. “There is often an inhibition threshold for teachers when it comes to religious 
extremism. They often tend to hesitate for longer because they don’t want to be invasive and are 
uncertain.” (Prev5, 09.01.2019) 
Accessibility, profile but also possible inhibition thresholds play a major role in the structure of the target 
audience. The fundamental integration as an authority in the administrative context can represent an 
obstacle for reporting cases, in particular for marginalised population groups. This is illustrated by the 
example of Tasamouh (a Muslim NGO providing prevention services from Biel) whose integration into 
a community facilitates access to it, whereas the specialist units firstly have to establish such trust.  
“Initially, when the initiative was launched, there was significant reluctance on the part of the Muslim 
organisations, teachers and social workers. Transparency is extremely important in relation to this 
contentious issue, otherwise it will not work. We saw that we had to go from door to door to provide 
information, above all for the Muslim organisations. Only then did they understand how the system 
works.” (Prev4, 30.11.2018)  
On the other hand, the state's (religious) neutrality can be an advantage because most of the target 
group want this. Integration of the specialist unit into the police force may make the service inaccessible. 
It nevertheless gives the specialist unit employees certain advantages related to police and security 
policy when dealing with cases. Integration into the Office of the Central School Board could result in 
parents no longer making reports for fear of the teaching staff finding out. Each form of integration has 
specific advantages and disadvantages. Low-threshold accessibility is important, particularly for initial 
contact, then consultation expertise seems to be the decisive factor: “It all depends on whether a good 
relationship with the person is established.” (Prev2, 23.08.2018) 
The specialist units work with various partners and authorities in their respective settings, such as school 




units for religious affairs: “We then decide together how to proceed and discuss solutions to complex 
situations which must first be analysed properly.” (Prev4, 30.11.2018) 
5.2.4 Initial evaluation 
All specialist units dealt with cases concerning conversion/reconversion, which caused concern for 
parents and teachers, particularly in conjunction with conflicts, school-leaving, travel to Muslim countries 
to attend a Koranic school and choice of partner etc. In these cases the specialist units attempted to 
obtain a clearer picture through the interview with the converted young persons and key persons around 
them and to assess the extent of the problem. They usually encourage parents to treat the young 
persons respectfully, to maintain contact with them and to avoid complete estrangement.  
An analysis of the 47 consultation cases recorded by the city of Bern specialist unit reveals that the 
issue of conversion arises in a quarter of the cases and conspicuous external changes or the expression 
of conspicuous views occur in around half of cases. Forms of strict religious practices, such as refusing 
handshakes, are evident in a further quarter of cases. Conspicuous circumstances, such as the 
expression of political/extremist views, missionary work, visiting problematic mosques or the possession 
of weapons, tend to occur rarely in the registered cases. The following images show the frequency at 
which individual issues occur in consultation cases, which were coded for content analysis purposes 
Possible risk of radicalisation Type and number of radicalisation phenomena for the 
registered cases (N=47) 
Personal crisis/change External change (12) 
Stress situation (7) 
Absenteeism (4) 
Isolation (2) 
Commitment to Islamist ideology Conversion (10) + reconversion (4) 
Strict religious practices (11) 
Missionary work (5) 
Mosque/Koranic school abroad (4) 
Violence-related communication Conspicuous views/statements (14) 
Extremist content on social media (9) 
Hate speech (2) 
Capability Religiously-motivated announcement of travel abroad (7) 
Conspicuous behaviour (5) 
Weapons (5) 
Social environment Risk due to romantic relationship (6) 
Isolation/withdrawal (5) 
Abrupt change in social relationships (2) 
Fig. 4: Most common issues in the consultation cases (N=47) of the extremism specialist unit in the city 





Many reports involve dealing with events that cannot usually be classified as radicalisation upon closer 
analysis – but where the expertise of the specialist unit is required as the persons faced with the problem 
feel anxious and lack the background knowledge required to assess the situations. 
“Islamic radicalisation has never actually been prevalent. It’s more often the case that somebody has 
taken a copy of the Koran to school with them or shouted ‘Allah-Akbar’. (…) In most cases it was 
nevertheless threatening and also often related to not being able to cope or feeling insecure at school.” 
(Prev6, 20.12.2018) 
Some specialist units use tools, such as RaProf, which allows the persons making reports to carry out 
a self-assessment where they can enter their evaluations anonymously via an online questionnaire and 
then receive feedback on how the case should be categorised. 
“We answer the telephone and carry out an initial evaluation and if we think that things could be heading 
in a certain direction we send a RaProf. The persons making reports find the questionnaire reassuring 
and informative.” (Prev5, 09.01.2019)  
We also contribute to the information brochures and processes drawn up for threat management so that 
school heads and teachers receive guidance: “We also use RaProf. This kind of questionnaire can help 
alleviate or dissipate the uncertainty or fear that arose.” (Prev9, 13.12.2018)  
Only the Basel specialist unit also provided training on dealing with conflict and violence. The individual 
young people are given training in dealing with conflict as a measure by the Office of the Juvenile 
Prosecutor or by the child and adult protection authority (CAPA). Relationship work also plays a key role 
in this respect: “The relationship work is valuable and is often successful. There are always young 
people who come back to us after undergoing this kind of training.” (Prev5, 09.01.2019)  
5.2.5 Case work 
“It takes time to really understand a situation. You need indications that the young person is progressing. 
If they are looking for information, they need people who can influence them, which is why long-term 
support is required.” (Prev7, 05.03.2019)  
If a case is complex, then more in-depth investigations are carried out, contact persons and other 
professionals are called in to work with the young person concerned and further information is gathered. 
A joint analysis of the available resources, strengths and weaknesses is then carried out: “We contact 
the platform, then mobilise the key persons and resources around the person, we try to calm the situation 
down and to provide support, we listen and adopt the resources-based approach to provide the parents, 
key persons and teaching staff with the tools they would not otherwise possess. In this way, we tackle 
the problem together and those involved are not on their own. We then remain available if we are 
needed. After a few weeks or months, depending on the case, we then call again to review the situation 
with the persons concerned.” (Prev10, 29.01.2019) 
This kind of monitoring supports the key persons intervening as they know they can get in touch at any 
time. It is usually them who implement the jointly drawn-up strategies and, for example, remain in close 
contact with the young persons concerned through less contentious discussions or by opening up new 
prospects with them. 
If necessary, the police (youth service, protection against violence unit) are involved: “…on a basis of 
trust, that remains protected; even if we have to press charges, we discuss it together. We are also in 
close contact with the FIS. Sometimes they will have cases where they come to us, or give our details 
to persons concerned, where security issues are not involved.” (Prev3, 24.01.2019). Most specialist 





In most cases queries from professionals usually concern second-level consultation without the need 
for direct contact between the specialist unit and the young person concerned. This usually involves the 
teaching relationship and the identification of changes and crisis potential, calls for help or signals which 
cannot be interpreted in a satisfactory way due to the professionals’ lack of background knowledge. In 
such situations there is often also a lack of acceptance and insufficient integration experience from the 
young persons concerned, who may turn to radical positions due to their experience of being 
marginalised and discriminated against, which results in them seeking to provoke persons responsible 
for looking after them. The consultation work carried out by the specialist units can analyse the causes 
and factors of radicalisation and help to promote ways of defusing the situation. 
In view of their interdisciplinary link role, the specialist units play an important part in triage and 
cooperation with the various partner institutions. They act as a bobbin as the various threads of the issue 
of radicalisation come together there (core group, round table, bilateral cooperation). Their expertise in 
additional prevention activities, such as public relations work (presentations, media relations, training 
etc.) is greatly appreciated and is called upon. With such a complex issue as radicalisation where 
psychological, pedagogical, sociological, political, legal, media and cultural factors must be taken into 
account, only an interdisciplinary approach seems to provide an adequate solution as this means the 
appropriate contact partners are called in for each situation. 
Some specialist unit heads indicated that they had received requests from the police in view of their 
expertise to make suggestions on issues concerning the interviewing or legal proceedings involving 
high-risk persons. Conversely, cases are passed onto the police if there are significant security concerns 
because radicalisation is at such an advanced stage. 
“We carried out a kind of triage role with the specialist group in one case and passed it over to the police 
who then gave the all-clear. The exchange in the specialist group works well - we all know each other 
and have the same instincts. Here we discuss who is already working on the case, otherwise we pass 
it onto the protection against violence specialist unit.” (Prev3, 24.01.2019) 
In Geneva, the cantonal security service passed the socio-pedagogical support of a young radicalised 
returning fighter to the FASE which is also involved in the ‘Gardez le lien’ initiative. A FASE social worker 
was assigned to the young man, supported him with his reintegration and, for example, tried to clear up 
any security concerns that employers had by acting as a guarantor. He established good contact with 
the parents and now also has a reasonable relationship with the young person who contacts and 
consults him when making decisions. The social worker and the security service regularly exchange 
information and are pursuing joint goals. This support represents a pioneering approach which may also 
be significant for future cases (Prev.12, 30.11.2018). 
5.2.6 Case vignettes 
We obtained case descriptions (N=89) from all specialist units which we have put together in 
anonymised form as case vignettes. They provide interesting insights into the requests received. The 
specialist units attempt to alleviate the anxiety of the persons making the reports and provide them with 
questions and tasks to understand the situation in a differentiated way and to then produce an evaluation 
in discussion with the expert. 
 
A social worker contacted the specialist unit about an 18-year-old young person, originally from 
Bosnia, due to his increasingly radical views. He had no religious background but found radical 
content on YouTube and thought his father had strayed from the right path. He had a cousin who he 
got interested in religious matters. Over time, both young men became strictly religious and their 




change them, which they do not want. They want to make their religious practices (prayers etc.) 
compatible with everyday life in Switzerland. 
 
The mother of an adult daughter, who is married to a man from Egypt and has two children, contacted 
the specialist unit. Her daughter’s family was considering emigration to Syria. The husband practised 
his faith and frequently attended the mosque with the eldest son. 
 
A secondary school teacher made a report about a pupil with an Algerian background who started 
displaying unusual behaviour after the holidays. The pupil had been to France where he had attended 
an Islamic centre. He had also watched jihad videos on YouTube. 
 
The school head made a report about a 14-year-old boy who posted an image of himself brandishing 
a weapon on social media. A home visit was made by the police. He then no longer attended school 
for several days and did not return home either during this period. His parents were very concerned. 
 
A German language teacher made a report about a young adult from Iraq who claimed not to be 
religious. He lived in a large shared flat where he was put under pressure to adopt a devout lifestyle 
by other Muslims. The teacher noticed changes in his appearance and the expression of very 
provocative views. 
 
A school social worker reported a 13-year-old girl who was interested in the Koran and wanted to 
wear a head scarf. In school she wrote in an essay that she did not know whether she would complete 
the school year and therefore wished she was in the war zone in Syria with a weapon. Her parents 
seemed to be making a big effort but were unable to cope with the situation. 
 
The school head contacted the specialist unit about a 15-year-old boy who said in school that he 
wanted to join the army and would kill everyone as his relatives had also been killed. He made the 
shape of a weapon with his hands and shot symbolically at fellow pupils and teachers and refused to 
attend religious education lessons. He was also conspicuous on account of his provocative behaviour 
and concentration difficulties. The parents distanced themselves from his behaviour. 
  
A work coach was supporting a client from Iraq with psychiatric problems. He had been recruited for 
jihad via Facebook by a colleague from Libya. Even though the client distanced himself from this, the 
work coach was concerned, due to his client’s psychological instability, that he may get involved in 
something he could then not get out of, even though he distanced himself from extremism during their 
meetings. 
 
At this point, we now look at a more detailed case vignette with the account of an intervention carried 





A mother contacted the specialist unit because she was concerned about the conversion of her son, 
who was previously a practising Catholic, to Islam. She feared there were negative outside influences, 
but did not really know her son’s circle of friends or whether he attended a mosque. She was also 
concerned by the fact that he had given up his vocational training to pursue a career in sport. As she 
was a practising Catholic herself, she found discussing religious matters with her son very difficult. 
During the consultation it was explained to her how she could improve the dialogue about religious 
matters with her son to better understand his new life circumstances. In a second step, a meeting was 
organised at the mosque with the son, the mother, the head of the specialist unit and a Muslim mediator. 
The aim of the joint meeting was to allow all parties to address their expectations, fears and any other 
questions. The mother remained dissatisfied with her son’s change of religion, but her fears over the 
risk of radicalisation were allayed. 
 
The choice of case vignettes shows the situations at the outset which are very specific and individual 
and require in-depth analysis in order to identify the issues that lie behind the symptoms. All of the case 
vignettes compiled are made available to all specialist units so that they can be used for internal staff 
training purposes. Due to the individual nature of each particular situation, added value can only be 
achieved from the findings through case learning which enables the development of good judgement 
and enhancement of the repertoire of intervention measures of the specialist unit employees. 
5.2.7 Conclusion 
The extremism specialist units provide support, in particular, for professionals working in the public 
administration, but also private persons, especially from the family and social environment, who are 
faced with situations related to jihadist radicalisation, ideologisation, violent tendencies or possible travel 
abroad and therefore trigger a sense of being unable to cope, anxiety and fear. In particular, rapid 
changes in young people and young adults, strict religious practices, turning away from their previous 
environment, radical views and behaviour deemed ‘irrational’ by those around them (see also Eser 
Davolio 2017) cause incomprehension and fears amongst persons around them. The specialist units 
are low-threshold points of contact to examine the existing cases, to provide advice, to act as a mediator 
and to carry out networking activities, to support cases and to pass them onto the police if security 
concerns arise. In most cases it turns out that personal crises or conversions have led to concerning 
situations and the persons making the reports receive reassurance and advice that helps them to resolve 
the situations. The extremism specialist units meet an existing requirement in the cities and cantons and 
perform an important link role through triage and cooperation with other specialist units. A small 
proportion of the cases turn out to involve serious radicalisation which is why the specialist units have 
to pass them onto the police. The specialist units do not find out what happens or what is corroborated 
in these cases for data protection reasons, which could nevertheless be important to their learning 
process in relation to the evaluation of cases. It is therefore worth considering whether an exchange 
with the security services in anonymised form (by changing the case data) could be achieved to help 
optimise the prevention work. 
In addition to the case work, the specialist units also make an important contribution to education and 
knowledge transfer in relation to extremism and violence – through public relations work, presentations 
and the answering of parliamentary questions etc. – which makes them a very important actor in terms 
of raising awareness. These skills could be used for further prevention work (e.g. in schools, parents’ 





5.3 Bridge-building specialist units 
5.3.1 Methodology 
A total of seven interviews (five verbal and two written) were conducted for the study with the existing 
specialist units in the cantons of Zurich, Bern and Fribourg as well as in the cities of Zurich and 
Winterthur. The new specialist unit in the canton of Schwyz was also interviewed by telephone but they 
have not obtained any experience yet. The new bridge-building units in Lugano and Baden operating in 
an urban environment and the coordination unit for religious issues in the canton of Basel Stadt were 
not included. The content of the interviews was recorded with written notes and was analytically 
evaluated. The text and the interview quotes were sent to the participants for review. The interview 
questions covered both the existing resources of the specialist units and their areas of activity, 
networking, prevention strategies applied and their effectiveness.  
5.3.2 Structure and resources of the bridge-building specialist units 
Various cantonal and city police forces have set up specialist units for community policing under the title 
of ‘police bridge-builders’ in recent years which carry out networking activities and the establishment of 
dialogue and good relations with migrant communities, the field of asylum and religious associations. In 
addition to fostering contacts, the aim is to establish mutual trust and to address integration issues 
(fundamental values, violence etc.) as well as to discuss security policy matters, in particular issues of 
extremism, whereby extremism prevention accounts for just one part of bridge-building activities.  
 
To obtain an overview, we asked about the resources available (percentage of working hours) which 
are designated for the individual specialist units (in descending order): 
 
City/canton Cumulative percentage of working hours Composition of the teams 
Canton of Zurich 380% (100% head plus 14 team 
members each working at 20% per 
region) 
Tandems, sometimes mixed 
City of Winterthur 150% Mixed tandem 
City of Zurich 100% Single position (male) 
Canton of Bern 80% (50% head plus 5-10% in four 
regions) 
Head (female), mixed in the 
regions 
Canton of Fribourg 70% (since April 2018, previously just 
50%) 
Single position (male) 
Table 4: Overview of the percentages of working hours and the team composition of the bridge-building 
specialist units (the new units in the cantons of Schwyz and Ticino and in the city of Baden are not 
listed). 
 
Some of the bridge-builders interviewed highlighted the importance of teamwork to exchange 
information as a tandem and to discuss the situations encountered together. The desire for mixed teams 
was also expressed on several occasions as the use of female police officers is regarded as having a 




“We see our role as cross-cultural community policing and we regard ourselves as the driving force to 
get this process on track so that contact with the police is established. We are not seeking to forge 
personal links with key persons, but rather to establish the relationship with the police at a structural 
level.” (Bridge-builder4, 21.11.2018) 
5.3.3 Cooperation and networking 
The bridge-building specialist units all have a broad-based network of cooperation and exchange 
partners which can be grouped as follows: 
- Asylum  (SEM/AOZ/ORS/HEKS/SAH/ECAP/Caritas/cantonal office for population and 
migration, migration service) 
- Security (state security, protection against violence, security directors, judicial and prison 
system, cantonal commission for prevention and security).  
- Social affairs (youth welfare office, department of social affairs, youth employment, child and 
adult protection authorities, extremism specialist unit) 
- Integration (integration specialist unit (cantonal/communal), racism prevention, specialist unit 
for forced marriage, FOM domestic violence, churches and forums for inter-religious exchange) 
- Judicial system (Office of the Juvenile Prosecutor, public prosecutor) 
In addition, there are also other contact partners, such as the office of economic affairs and employment, 
to obtain legal certainty for the work permits of imams as well as regional NGOs and prevention projects, 
such as gggfon in the canton of Bern or TikK/NCBI in the canton of Zurich.  Another important network 
exists with the Islamic umbrella associations with which regular contact is maintained and who approach 
them concerning events, festivities etc. The exchange with mosque associations, but also other religious 
communities and migrant associations is maintained with one to three meetings a year on average, but 
meetings can take place more frequently depending on current developments.  
Three of the specialist units interviewed are in close regular contact with the extremism specialist units 
and the integration specialist unit – for example, in the form of a core group – on the coordination of 
mosque visits etc. This exchange of information is deemed very important and enables a coordinated 
approach to be adopted. The cantonal bridge-builders also exchange with the city bridge-builders on 
the distribution of tasks and current developments and there is also a national committee of Swiss 
bridge-builders which meets on a half-yearly basis under the leadership of the cantonal police forces of 
Bern and Zurich. 
5.3.4 Areas of activity 
Through regular contact and exchange, the bridge-builders attempt to establish a basis of trust, not least 
with the Muslim organisations. Some set fixed discussion topics, such as family and the position of 
women, while other specialist units address different topics at the joint exchange meetings, depending 
on the situation.  
“This is an important aspect but it’s not the only one, we are not an extremism specialist unit, but we do 
have an influence over the prevention of extremism.” (Bridge-builder4, 21.11.2018) 
While some specialist units indicated that mosque visits and Islamic extremism were their main fields of 
activity, others focus on the field of asylum and information events as part of German language courses 
to present the police and contact opportunities to migrant associations. Other activities are also carried 
out depending on the specialist unit. For some specialist units these include consultation work for 
institutions (school, youth work) and parents, for example in relation to the conversion of young people, 




activities, such as the design and production of information brochures/materials, which are primarily 
used for training in the field of asylum, and other resources used for police training on ‘intercultural skills’.  
There is usually more contact with the leaders of the mosque associations than the imams who, in some 
cases, change every few years and do not usually speak German very well. The extent to which the 
bridge-building specialist units support the interests of the mosque associations varies, but an 
intermediary role seems to build trust. 
“If requests are made in other areas, such as a planning application at the moment to build a new 
mosque, I refer them to people if I’m able to help and then support them because this helps to build 
trust.”  (Bridge-builder 1, 18.12.2018) 
The situations facing the mosques in the local district are also a major topic of discussion. There have 
sometimes been minor neighbourhood disputes in areas near mosques, for example over cars not being 
parked properly. The bridge-building specialist units act as intermediaries in such situations as part of 
community policing and can play an important role. The bridge-building specialist units act as information 
hubs – in particular between associations and the police – where lots of information comes together and 
is collected. 
“We also do educational work, for example on the ‘Lies’ campaign, foster relationships, establish 
contacts and carry out behaviour prevention activities whereby they receive the knowledge required 
from us to better assume their responsibility and can obtain advice – including in anonymised form – if 
someone is radicalised or brandishing weapons.” (Bridge-builder4, 21.11.2018) 
5.3.5 Prevention strategies 
Serious issues are also discussed with the mosque leaders and imams by establishing trust and 
constant dialogue, such as domestic violence, the Federal Constitution, adherence to Swiss law, 
equality and violence in public places, which may be related to police work or also go beyond it. These 
discussions are also often linked to security advice in the interests of the mosque associations, for 
example by calling in internal police experts on anti-burglary protection etc. In turn, they also promote 
the assumption of responsibility for events within the mosques (e.g. in ‘back rooms’) and can promote 
and call for radicalisation prevention (also see Müller et al. 2018 and Ülger and Çelik 2018). The 
specialist units are also contact partners for police interventions (searches, arrests etc.) and act as an 
information hub so that the police approach can be understood.  
“One mosque association called me immediately when the police carried out a major operation. Now 
my colleagues in the police force also contact me beforehand because it puts me in an awkward position 
if I don’t know what is going on. So I now act as an intermediary and was able to hold a follow-up meeting 
with the mosque leaders afterwards.” (Bridge-builder2, 21.09.2018) 
Here they enable direct dialogue and can explain the background to and reasons for a search, thus 
providing a direct link to the police. In addition to the personal contact via a Facebook page (one page 
per religious community), in the city of Zurich this direct contact also takes place through a closed group 
as part of NETPOL (pilot project of the Zurich city police force) to exchange information on current 
incidents concerning religious institutions, such as spray-painted graffiti.  
The differentiation from the repressive function of the police is important for all specialist units, even if 
this distinction is sometimes made to a greater or lesser extent. Trust-building nevertheless also seems 
to take place even during repressive activities, such as if rooms are opened voluntarily during searches 
and a debrief on the situation is then provided afterwards. With regard to training in the field of asylum, 
it is primarily about tackling feelings of uncertainty, prejudices and mistrust of asylum seekers towards 




“We mainly carry out very detailed work and can spend half a day in a class, for example – it’s a big 
investment, but it helps to alleviate fears. We provide advice and promote a respectful approach from 
both sides.” (Bridge-builder 1, 18.12.2018) 
Not just asylum seekers, but also their mentors receive training from the bridge-building units. Internal 
police training on migration and religious issues is carried out and e-learning modules are produced in 
some cantons. Information about security-relevant developments is also passed on to better evaluate 
problematic behaviour by individuals or groups.  
“Every community police officer, but also every other cantonal police officer can obtain information about 
radicalisation when on duty. We collect, analyse and process all of this information at a central unit. 
Security issues are also looked at here, for example in relation to demonstrations that may present 
problems.” (Bridge-builder5, 26.02.2019) 
In the past, this has led to the closure of problematic mosques or a clear line of action towards the ‘Lies’ 
campaign in individual cases. 
5.3.6 Impact of the prevention strategies applied  
All study participants interviewed found it difficult to determine the preventative impact, as assessing the 
direct effects is not straightforward. However, they all confirmed that progress on trust-building had been 
achieved by maintaining contacts, making it more effective. Early recognition would appear to be 
important in the field of extremism and violence. 
“Mosques are open houses and they now understand that they need supervisors (people who carry out 
checks) to obtain an overview of what is going on in the rooms, but also around the mosque and in the 
neighbourhood. Checks are required as what goes on inside is often not clear.” (Bridge-builder2, 
21.09.2018) 
A further recognisable effect is allaying fears and overcoming a perception of distance. The associations 
would usually only ask the bridge-builders for support if they were under pressure and could not resolve 
a matter themselves (Bridge-builder 1, 18.12.2018).  
“Estimating the impact is always difficult – I’d be cautious about that. It primarily concerns prevention of 
behaviour by providing knowledge about what is legal etc. That is definitely more firmly established. 
Another significant effect is that people tend to come to us, not necessarily with a deep trust, but the 
contact threshold is lower. We cannot change attitudes and we cannot get involved in religious debate. 
We do not perform an advocacy role.” (Bridge-builder4, 21.11.2018) 
Establishing contact and trust-building also have a positive impact on the attitude of the target group 
towards the police in general. 
“We can show the police in a different light through the bridge-building work, which presents a different 
picture to the target group and has an effect on all police work – including within the police force.” 
(Bridge-builder 1, 18.12.2018) 
Conversely, the trust established can be quickly lost if repressive police interventions fuel mistrust and 
rejection. The bridge-builders obviously cannot give warning of planned raids, but they can speak to the 
intervention team beforehand and deal with any unresolved issues with the mosque associations 
afterwards which can help to calm situations down. 
 “Trust is extremely complex and lots of things can go wrong during a major police operation. That’s why 
it’s important that I know about it. The fine line between repression and trust-building in the police force 




This is why communication and the procedure during mosque searches are vitally important and 
personal contact can be very useful. If the concerns of the police are understood and the procedure is 
carried out correctly, rooms are opened voluntarily and there is no lingering resentment. 
The knowledge of the bridge-builders is also useful in case work on the prevention of violence with 
adults and young people, especially in work on a personal level, with home visits to persons suspected 
of presenting a risk. Situations can be better evaluated and approached through contact with key figures 
in the Muslim communities. 
5.3.7 Conclusion 
The prevention strategies in the individual cantons and cities are generally based on a common 
understanding of community policing, focusing on dialogue and trust-building, low-threshold consultation 
and interdisciplinary and inter-institutional cooperation, with differentiation from the repressive functions 
of the field of security (the extent of this distinction varies depending on the specialist unit).  
In view of the usually limited personnel resources, the question is raised as to whether either the 
educational work in the field of asylum or the development of contacts with the mosque associations 
should take priority or whether both areas should be pursued with equal intensity. From the perspective 
of extremism prevention, the prioritisation of developing contacts with the mosque associations would 
be preferable, as the field of asylum usually involves universal prevention and only basic knowledge can 
often be conveyed due to the language barrier. In contrast, a level of trust is established in the work with 
the mosque associations that is a key requirement in order to address sensitive extremism issues and 
allows for jointly supported prevention measures based on a relationship of partnership. The bridge-
building prevention approach goes beyond fostering relationships in relation to state security and 
therefore represents added value. 
With regard to the approach of the bridge-building specialist units, there is reciprocal ‘give and take’ in 
the establishment of contacts and trust-building with the mosque associations when a supporting role is 
performed, for example with issues like neighbourhood conflicts or security concerns. The bridge-
building units also provide an important link in exchange with other prevention agencies. The impact of 
their prevention work could be better determined by using a comparative effectiveness evaluation of 
cantons with and without bridge-building units. 
6 Focus group feedback 
The two focus group meetings – at the start (06.07.2018) and towards the end of the project (28.02.2019) 
– provided suggestions and allowed a critical discussion of the procedure and a validation of the results 
which were incorporated into the research report. They were attended by experts from the Office of the 
Attorney General of Switzerland, the Federal Office of Police, the Federal Intelligence Service, the Swiss 
Security Network, the FDFA’s Section for International Security, the Swiss Competence Centre for the 
Execution of Criminal Penalties, the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, the Institute of 
Delinquency and Crime Prevention, the Department of Social Work at the Zurich University of Applied 
Sciences, the Institute of Practical Theology at the University of Bern, the extremism specialist units in 
the cities of Bern, Basel and Winterthur, the canton of Geneva and the Zurich cantonal police force. 





7 Summary and conclusions  
Radicalisation background: The evaluation of the data provided to us by the FIS enabled a 
differentiated picture of the jihadist-radicalised persons in Switzerland to be presented. The comparison 
with corresponding studies from the neighbouring countries of Germany, France and Italy allows certain 
correlations to be identified, such as the fact that jihadist radicalisation mainly concerns men aged 18 to 
35, second-generation immigrants62, persons living in urban areas who tend to have a low level of 
education and who are poorly integrated into the employment market. As in other European states, 
converts are disproportionately highly represented amongst jihadist-radicalised persons, accounting for 
around a fifth. As also observed in Germany and France, it seems that the consumption of applicable 
content on the internet also plays an important supporting role in Switzerland, but is only a sufficient 
criterion for radicalisation alone in very few cases. Group dynamics and contact in the real world with 
like-minded people also play a decisive role in Switzerland. 
Radicalisation and the prison system: The prison system must meet the challenges of jihadist-
radicalised inmates with regard to placement, execution of sentences and institutional and individual 
monitoring. The prison system institutions have to draw up plans to deal with the existing risks in a 
targeted way. This means involving professionals in the fields of medicine, psychology and social work, 
pastoral carers, prison officers and the probationary service and providing them with targeted training 
so that they possess sufficient background knowledge and skill sets to deal with radicalised persons 
vigilantly and professionally. The (relative) lack of resocialisation measures during pre-trial detention 
(particularly for longer terms) is sometimes underestimated by the prison authorities as a risk when 
assessing developments after release from prison. The prison institutions that work with imams and 
Muslim chaplains, who are recognised based on their professional and theological competencies, 
believe their involvement is important which is why it is recommended that this experience is taken into 
account to a greater extent in institutional reflections on prevention and disengagement.  
Prevention and intervention: In the field of prevention, the extremism and bridge-building specialist 
units have been expanded since 2015, particularly in the cities and cantons which were or are affected 
by jihadist radicalisation to a greater extent. The level of resources, the integration of the specialist units, 
their tasks and their approaches differ but common intervention strategies and forms of interdisciplinary 
cooperation can be identified. In view of the great variance, the development of minimum requirements 
regarding resources, frequency of contact and inter-institutional cooperation would represent an 
appropriate approach in order for effective prevention work to be carried out. On the other hand, in view 
of the differing number and variety of cases (frequency of various phenomena, every case is individual 
etc.), exchange of experience between the specialist units to develop expertise is vital so that the 
evaluation capacity and repertoire of intervention measures can be continually extended and enhanced. 
Finally, in comparison to the 2015 study by Eser Davolio et al., both the knowledge about the background 
to jihadist radicalisation and the strategies in the field of prevention and intervention have been refined, 
which means better coordination between early recognition, investigation, diagnosis and consultation 
etc. can take place – provided the relevant specialist units and resources are available in the individual 
cantons. The alignment of the specialist units towards a general form of extremism and violence 
prevention makes these services more independent of changing current forms of extremism and 











8 Recommendations  
Recommendations regarding radicalisation: 
1. The conspicuous features of jihadist radicalisation point to a shift away or distancing from 
society. Early recognition in such cases can increase the chances of successful prevention and 
intervention. 
2. A multifaceted approach should be adopted for the reintegration of radicalised persons, able to 
adapt to various shortcomings (academic and professional, economic, delinquency) and 
requirements. 
3. Targeted protective measures are required to protect vulnerable groups of persons against 
propaganda and recruitment by peers and recruiters who exploit their needs and shortcomings 
and can also use religious lines of argument to persuade them, as most have little theological 
knowledge (particularly converts), and lead them into the spiral of radicalisation. 
Recommendations on the challenges faced during imprisonment: 
1. The communication between the various authorities involved (Office of the Attorney General of 
Switzerland, Federal Intelligence Service, fedpol, State Secretariat for Migration, cantonal 
prison authority) is vitally important. Each partner must have the relevant information in their 
professional field to ensure effective management (for example, information on psychological 
profiles). 
2. The creation of penitentiary centres specialised in the placement, management and monitoring 
of this type of inmate, based on the main population groups affected by radicalisation, may 
represent a suitable approach. Expertise and experience could then be optimised from two or 
three competence centres in Switzerland. 
3. The disengagement plans in prison should take account of the reality of the situation in the 
establishments. Their nature will differ according to the type of sentence, the population, current 
events and the general climate in the prison itself. While guidelines can be a useful comparative 
tool, the establishment must be given room for manoeuvre with regard to the internal system of 
security management. Furthermore, optimisation of the probationary and therapeutic follow-up 
services for this type of former prisoner is also desirable. 
4. For the prisoners identified as radicalised at their entry in prison, measures of resocialisation 
aiming to a disengagement should be implemented in short times. Indeed, the pretrial detention 
can sometimes exceed the length of the sentences, and therefore an anticipation of the 
implementation of a follow up is desirable. 
5. The Muslim chaplains and imams63 play a key preventative role. Their knowledge and skills can 
also serve the interest of prison staff, in particular in relation to matters concerning religious 
practices, but also sentences or slogans written in Arabic found in cells, the interpretations of 
certain works and authors and the relevance of translations of the Koran etc. However, it is 
important that they are part of the approach adopted by the chaplaincy, but also towards the 
challenges of imprisonment. 
Prevention and intervention: 
1) The cities and cantons concerned have set up extremism specialist units over recent years that 
cover a wide range of extremism-related issues. This seems sensible as the forms of extremism 
 




are constantly changing. Further expansion of regional alliances is recommended here so that 
points of contact offering consultation services are available nationwide. 
2) Networking between the specialist units and other specialised units (such as the school 
psychology service) enables a broad-based approach for both the initial assessment as well as 
for consultation work. The extremism specialist units should therefore be provided with sufficient 
resources and structures to carry out such interdisciplinary collaboration. 
3) The decisive factor in the level of competence of the specialist units is their experience horizon 
and expertise in the specific case work on extremism, which is why the exchange of experiences 
between the specialist units in the form of case meetings and peer consultation should be 
stepped up.  
4) The objective of the bridge-building specialist units is to establish trust with mosque associations 
in order to prevent extremism. To assess the attainment of objectives and the level of impact, a 
comparison of cantons with and without bridge-building specialist units would be an appropriate 
method. 
5) In the case of existing bridge-building specialist units, intercultural networking with mosque 
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